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Dynamic pricing schemes are increasingly employed across industries to main-
tain a self-organized balance of demand and supply. However, throughout com-
plex dynamical systems, unintended collective states exist that may compromise
their function. Here we reveal how dynamic pricing may induce demand-supply
imbalances instead of preventing them. Combining game theory and time se-
ries analysis of dynamic pricing data from on-demand ride-hailing services, we
explain this apparent contradiction. We derive a phase diagram demonstrating
how and under which conditions dynamic pricing incentivizes collective action
of ride-hailing drivers to induce anomalous supply shortages. By disentangling
different timescales in price time series of ride-hailing services at 137 locations
across the globe, we identify characteristic patterns in the price dynamics re-
flecting these anomalous supply shortages. Our results provide systemic insights
for the regulation of dynamic pricing, in particular in publicly accessible mo-
bility systems, by unraveling under which conditions dynamic pricing schemes
promote anomalous supply shortages.
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INTRODUCTION
Complex engineered systems are known to exhibit unintended states in their collective
dynamics that often disrupt their function [1–5]. In complex mobility systems, examples in-
clude the emergence of congestion [6, 7], anomalous random walks in human travel patterns
[8] and cascading failures of mobility networks [9–11]. As urban mobility becomes increas-
ingly self-organized and digitized, mobility services increasingly employ dynamic pricing
schemes [12–16]. Dynamic pricing in general serves two main purposes (Fig. 1a). First,
it adjusts the price of a product or service to compensate for changes in its intrinsic base
cost. Second, it creates incentives for all market participants to equilibrate demand-supply
imbalances by increasing the price if demand exceeds supply and vice versa. A higher price
both imposes higher costs to customers incentivizing them to decrease their demand and,
at the same time, offers higher profit for identical service to suppliers, in turn motivating
them to increase their supply.
However, recent reports on on-demand ride-hailing [17–19] indicate that dynamic pric-
ing may have the opposite effect and instead cause demand-supply imbalances. Here we
quantitatively demonstrate the existence of these imbalances by comparing price time series
and demand estimates for ride-hailing services. In a game theoretic analysis we reveal the
incentive structure for drivers to induce anomalous supply shortages as a generic feature
of dynamic pricing. This observation suggests that similar dynamics should emerge inde-
pendent of the location or industry. Comparing price time series for 137 locations in 59
urban areas across six continents we indeed find price dynamics reflecting anomalous supply
shortages in several cities around the world.
2
RESULTS
Dynamic pricing schemes in mobility services are commonly applied by on-demand mo-
bility service providers, such as Lyft and Uber [15, 16]. For Uber, the price of the service
(the total fare for a ride) decomposes into the same two parts described above [16], base
cost pbase and surge fee psurge,
p = pbase + psurge(D,S) , (1)
as illustrated in Figure 1b for trips from Reagan National Airport (DCA) to Union Station
in Washington, D.C. (see Methods and Supplementary Material for more information).
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FIG. 1. Dynamic pricing in on-demand mobility. a, Schematic illustration of dynamic pric-
ing. The total price separates into the base cost of the product or service and a supply and demand
dependent surge fee. Three fundamental mechanisms underlying price changes are (i) changes of
the base cost, (ii) demand exceeding current supply levels and (iii) supply shortage compared to
current demand. Price adaptations (ii) and (iii) are intended to drive the system back to a supply-
demand equilibrium. b, The total fare for Uber ride-hailing services similarly decomposes into
base cost and surge fee. Base cost depend on trip duration and reflect current traffic conditions
while surge fees result from supply-demand imbalances. Both effects are illustrated here for trips
between Reagan National Airport (DCA) and Washington Union Station in Washington, D.C.,
USA. During commuting hours (grey) base cost increase because of longer expected trip duration
during rush-hour. The slower speed effectively reduces the supply of available drivers as they spend
more time in traffic and naturally causes accompanying surge fees. During late evening and night-
time, the total fare exhibits repeated price surges triggered by supply-demand imbalances (dashed
box) not reflected in the demand dynamics (passenger capacity of airplanes landing in DCA). c,
Supporting the previous observation, no apparent correlation exists between the surge fee and the
demand dynamics during the evening hours (20:00 - 02:00), even at five and 38 minute delays,
the two local maxima of the correlation function (see Supplementary Material for a more detailed
analysis).
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The first component (base cost) are regular fees for a ride
pbase = p0 + pt ∆t+ pl ∆l , (2)
including one-off fees p0 as well as trip fees pt and pl, proportional to the duration ∆t and
distance ∆l of the trip, similar to the fare for a typical taxi cab. These base cost increase,
for example, during times of heavy traffic, such as morning and evening commuting hours
(grey shading in Fig. 1b) when the trip duration ∆t increases due to congestion.
The second component (surge fee psurge) implements Uber’s surge pricing algorithm [16,
20] and reflects the time evolution of supply-demand imbalances. The surge fee increases
due to persistent supply-demand imbalance during commuting hours. Longer trip duration
means that drivers spend more time in traffic serving the same number of customers which
effectively reduces the supply of available drivers compared to the demand and causes an
increase of the surge fee. These price surges are meant to incentivize customers to delay
their request, reducing the current demand, as well as to incentivize drivers to offer their
service in areas or at times with high demand, increasing the supply.
As illustrated in Fig. 1b, during the evening the system settles to constant base cost,
reflecting constant trip duration in uncongested traffic. Yet, even under these apparent
equilibrium conditions, the surge fee exhibits a series of short, repeated price surges (dashed
box in Fig. 1b) that are not reflected in the demand dynamics (Fig. 1c). Consistent with this
observation, recent reports [17–19] suggest that Uber drivers at DCA and other locations
cause artificial supply shortages on purpose to induce these price surges. This behavior
enables drivers to increase their revenue by capitalizing on the increased total fare. Still,
a couple of key questions remain open. First, what is the dynamic origin of these non-
equilibrium dynamics and under which conditions do they emerge? Second, can this non-
equilibrium state be identified from available data without direct observation of the supply
dynamics?
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FIG. 2. Incentive structure in dynamic pricing. a, A two player game captures the
fundamental incentives for drivers. Both drivers compete for a fixed average number of customers
1 ≤ D ≤ 2. The drivers may choose to temporarily switch off their apps to induce an artificial
supply shortage and additional surge fees (see Methods and Supplementary Material for details).
(top left): If both drivers keep their apps on, both earn plow ($) with probability D/2. (top right
and bottom left): If one driver switches their app off, the total fare increases to pmid ($$). However,
the other driver exploits their first-mover advantage to secure a customer, earning guaranteed pmid,
while the offline driver only earns (D − 1) pmid from the remaining demand. (bottom right): If
both drivers switch off their apps, they induce a larger supply deficit and thus a larger surge fee,
resulting in the total fare phigh ($$$). Both drivers again share the demand equally when they
go back online. b, Phase diagram of the resulting Nash equilibria in the two player game. (i): If
the demand is sufficiently large, the game is trivial and both drivers always switch off their app,
triggering anomalous supply shortages (orange). At low demand the game becomes a prisoner’s
dilemma [21] or stag hung [22] and both drivers remain online (green). (ii) and (iii): As the
demand becomes more elastic and decreases as the price increases, drivers switching off their app
risk missing out on a customer completely and the parameter range promoting artificial price surges
becomes smaller (orange). Drivers are more likely to both remain online (green). c, A dynamic
game with multiple drivers (see Methods and Supplementary Material for details) qualitatively
reproduces the observed dynamics (compare DCA, Fig. 1b): Sustained non-zero surge fees occur
during commuting hours (grey). During non-commuting hours, drivers cooperate to induce artificial
supply shortages and create price surges to optimize their collective profit.
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A first principles game theoretic description captures the fundamental incentives under-
lying the anomalous supply shortages: S = 2 drivers are competing for a fixed demand D
aiming to maximize their expected profit (Fig. 2a). For illustration, we take a piecewise
linear function such that drivers earn the total fare
p′(S,D) =
pbase if S ≥ Dpbase + pmaxsurge D−SD else
when they serve a customer, where pbase denotes the (constant) base cost and p
max
surge denotes
the maximum possible surge fee when S = 0 (see Methods and Supplementary Material
for details). Each driver has the option to temporarily not offer their service, contributing
to an artificial supply shortage, S < 2. As drivers turn off their app, the fare increases
from plow = p
′(2, D) with both drivers online over pmid = p′(1, D) ≥ plow as one driver
goes offline to phigh = p
′(0, D) ≥ pmid when both drivers withhold their service. While
drivers who do not offer their service would typically miss out on a customer, the use of
online mobile applications in most ride-sharing services enables them to quickly change their
decision. Turning their app back on, they can capitalize on the additional surge fee and earn
the higher total fare by quickly accepting a customer before the dynamic pricing algorithm
reacts (Fig. 2a, see Methods for details).
Figure 2b illustrates the phase diagram of the resulting Nash equilibria. When the de-
mand is inelastic and does not change as the price increases [Fig. 2b, panel (i)], the payoff
structure of the game changes from a prisoner’s dilemma [21] over a stag hunt [22] to a
trivial game as demand increases. At low demand, the high risk of completely missing out
on a customer if the other driver remains online disincentivizes switching off the app. At
high demand, this risk disappears and drivers always profit from inducing artificial supply
shortages to earn the additional surge fee. As the demand becomes more elastic, i.e. the
demand decreases in response to an increase of the total fare as
D′(p′, D) = D (1− δ (p′ − pbase)) (3)
where δ denotes the price elasticity of the demand, the risk of missing out on a customer
increases and the range of parameters where artificial price surges are incentivized becomes
smaller [Fig. 2b, panel (ii) and (iii)].
In general the specific conditions promoting artificial price surges depend on the details
of the demand dynamics. Nonetheless, the supply-side incentives remain qualitatively un-
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changed and are a generic property of dynamic pricing schemes. To isolate the impact of
these supply side incentives, we simulate a time-continuous game under constant conditions
(constant demand, a constant number of drivers and a constant price elasticity of demand)
where the ON-OFF-decisions of the drivers are the only remaining dynamics (Fig. 2c).
Drivers react to the current conditions and can choose to turn their app on or off at any
time. They contribute to an artificial supply shortage if sufficiently many other idle drivers
are willing to also participate, following their mean-field optimal strategy. To avoid never
making profit, however, individual drivers remain offline only for a short amount of time,
explicitly fixing the timescale of potential artificial price surges (see Supplementary Mate-
rial for details). The simulations reproduce qualitatively the same non-equilibrium price
dynamics as observed in the recorded price data (compare Fig. 1b): Increases of the trip
duration during commuting hours (grey shading in Fig. 2c) are accompanied by a sustained
supply-demand imbalance and surge fees without drivers turning off their app. At other
times, the drivers create short, artificial price surges to maximize their profit. This result
demonstrates that the systemic incentives in dynamic pricing schemes alone are sufficient to
cause anomalous supply dynamics.
The fact that these incentives are generic to dynamic pricing schemes suggests that ar-
tificial supply shortages and non-equilibrium surge dynamics emerge independent of the
location. However, direct observation of the supply dynamics, e.g. of the number and lo-
cation of online drivers, is typically impossible as this information is not publicly available.
Even with the above results, a bottom-up prediction is practically not feasible since the
exact conditions under which these dynamics are promoted depend on the specific details
of the trip, the local demand dynamics, publicly unavailable details on the surge pricing
algorithm as well as additional external influences such as local legislation.
We overcome these obstacles by exploiting the characteristic temporal structure of the
surge dynamics (compare Fig. 1b) to identify locations with similar dynamics that are charac-
teristic for artificial supply shortages. Based only on the price time series, without requiring
further input on demand or supply or the specific dynamic pricing algorithm, we quantify
the timescales of normalized price changes ∆p for 137 different routes in 59 urban areas
across six continents (Fig. 3a, see Methods for details). The distribution of price changes
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separates into a slow and fast timescale and a contribution where the price does not change
P (∆p) = wbase Pbase (∆p;σbase) + wsurge Psurge (∆p;σsurge) + w0 δ(∆p) . (4)
The slow price changes Pbase (∆p;σbase) describe changes of the base cost varying as slowly
as traffic conditions change during the day. The fast price changes Psurge (∆p;σsurge) are
associated with sudden changes of the surge fee. The last term w0 δ(∆p) describes times
when the price remains constant price and contributes only at ∆p = 0, where δ represents
the Dirac-Delta distribution and w0 the remaining weight w0 = 1− wbase − wsurge.
Characterizing the contribution wsurge of the surge fee and the magnitude σsurge of the as-
sociated price changes with a maximum likelihood Gaussian mixture model fit (see Methods
for details)
Px(∆p;σx) =
1√
2piσ2x
e
−∆p2
2σ2x (5)
with x ∈ {base, surge} we find locations without surge activity (Fig. 3b and c) as well as
locations with strong but infrequent price surges (Fig. 3e). Importantly, we also identify
several locations with price change characteristics similar to those observed at DCA, with
a high magnitude and contribution of surge price changes, suggesting strong and frequent
price surges potentially driven by anomalous supply dynamics (compare Fig. 3d).
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FIG. 3. Characterizing non-equilibrium surge dynamics. The timescales of price changes
characterize the surge dynamics at different locations. These price changes separate into small, slow
changes Pbase corresponding to varying base costs and fast, strong changes Psurge corresponding
to the surge fee (red and blue line in the histograms in (b)-(e), respectively). a, Characterizing
locations by the total weight wsurge of the surge component of the price change distribution and the
magnitude σsurge of the associated price changes reveals several locations [e.g., Warsaw, Montreal,
Chicago, New York City [city(1) and station(2)] and Chennai] with similar characteristics to DCA
(see Fig. 4 and Methods and Supplementary Material for more details and additional examples).
b and c, Locations with low surge strength σsurge exhibit no significant surge activity and no
price changes on a fast time scale, shown here for Johannesburg (JNB, South Africa) and Brussels
(BRU, Belgium). d, Locations with high surge strength σsurge and small surge contribution wsurge
exhibit relatively few price surges (San Francisco, USA). e, Locations with high surge strength
σsurge and high surge contribution wsurge exhibit a large number of fast price surges potentially
driven by artificially induced supply shortages. Figure 4 confirms that the surge fee dynamics at
these locations is indeed similar to the dynamics observed at DCA (Washington D.C., USA).
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FIG. 4. Identifying non-equilibrium surge dynamics and anomalous supply shortages.
Repeated price surges similar to those observed at DCA (compare Fig. 3e) emerge in locations
across the globe (America, Asia and Europe) and independent of type of origin (airport, train
station and other prominent locations). The surge dynamics at the six locations identified in Fig. 3a
is qualitatively and statistically similar to DCA. The time scale separation indicates that all these
observed surge dynamics are similar to characteristic dynamics of anomalous supply shortages. In
particular, sustained periods with non-zero surge fee likely reflect a real supply-demand imbalance
at that time while periods with repeated surge peaks are characteristic for price surges induced by
artificial supply shortages (e.g. Warsaw evening, Montreal evening, Chicago evening, New York
City afternoon and evening).
Indeed, all of the identified locations exhibit qualitatively similar non-equilibrium surge
fee dynamics with a large number of repeated price surges, in particular during evening hours,
demonstrating that the phenomenon is ubiquitous (Fig. 4, see Supplementary Material for
additional examples). While these results do not directly imply that the price surges at
these locations are artificially induced, the similarity to confirmed artificial price surges and
the universality of the incentives for drivers makes it a likely conclusion.
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DISCUSSION
In summary, we quantitatively demonstrated the emergence of non-equilibrium price
dynamics in on-demand mobility systems at various locations across the globe. We showed
that the fundamental incentives sufficient for promoting their emergence through supply
anomalies constitute a generic property of dynamic pricing schemes. In particular, these
incentives are independent of the urban area, the specific route, or the exact type of mobility
service and should even apply across industries. Our methodology to classify the price
dynamics of on-demand mobility systems without explicit knowledge about the time-resolved
demand and supply evolution
enables a direct, systematic search for supply anomalies based on price time series only.
Furthermore, characterizing the incentives and the conditions that promote artificially in-
duced price surges enables targeted action to suppress the emergence of such supply anoma-
lies. Specific actions may include offering ride-sharing options [23–26] (effectively lowering
the demand, compare Fig. 2b) or providing more or alternative public transport options
(effectively increasing the price elasticity of demand, compare Fig. 2b). In particular, our
results suggest that limiting the maximum surge fee, as done in response to the initial reports
from DCA [27] and frequently discussed as potential legislation [28, 29], is not an effective
response and may even result in the opposite effect if the demand is highly elastic (compare
Chennai, Fig. 4).
In general, with the emergence of digital platforms, sharing economies and autonomous
vehicle fleets, mobility services are becoming increasingly self-organized and complex such
that new, potentially unintended collective dynamics will emerge [1, 3–5, 7, 11, 30]. Our re-
sults provide conceptual insights into these dynamics to support the creation and regulation
of fair, efficient and transparent publicly available mobility services [23–26, 31, 32].
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METHODS
Data sources and acquisition. In this work we recorded approximately 28 million ride-
hailing price estimates for 137 routes of Uber rides in 59 urban areas across six continents
between 19-05-31 and 19-06-25. We distinguish between four types of routes based on the
origin location: 63 airport, 23 convention center, 12 train station and 39 city trips (see
Supplementary Data for detailed information and precise GPS coordinates of the different
routes).
For each route, we prompted total fare requests with a fixed interval via Uber’s price
estimate API endpoint recording the price estimates for each route every 2 to 30 seconds.
Per request, the API returned lower and upper total fare estimates for all Uber products
operating in the local area as well as estimated distance and duration of the trip which we
equipped with the request timestamp. Using Uber’s products API endpoint, we comple-
mented the price estimate data with information on local booking fee, price per minute,
price per mile, distance unit, minimum fees and the currency code parameter per product
and location. We convert all price estimates to US Dollars based on currency exchange rates
provided by the European Central Bank for the date of recording.
In all our analyses, we work with the lower estimate of the local economy product (UberX,
UberGO in India).
Base cost. To determine the base cost (sum of pickup fee, trip fee and surcharges)
of a trip we first compute the trip fee based on the price per mile, price per minute and
the estimated trip length and duration. We add the pickup fee obtained from the Uber
products API. Since data on the surcharges (e.g. airport fees or tolls) of individual trips is
not available, we take surcharges to be constant for each trip. We subtract the pickup fee
and trip fee from the price estimate and take the minimum value of this remaining surge
fee and surcharge cost as estimate of the surcharges, such that zero surge fee occurs at least
once in the recorded price estimates.
Surge fee. To estimate the surge fee time series we subtract the base cost of the respec-
tive product from the total fare estimate. Since the available price estimates are rounded
to integer values, the recorded price estimate may not reflect all changes of the trip fare
14
especially for shorter trips with lower absolute total fare). This leads to small fluctuations
in the extracted surge fee that do not correspond to actual surge activity.
Airport arrival data. To estimate the demand for rides at airports, we record the
number of arrivals at each of the 63 airports where we recorded price estimates. We col-
lected aircraft landing times, call signs and type of aircraft using flightradar24’s open API
in the corresponding time frame, as well as information on the different aircraft’s current
seat configuration obtained via flightera.net. We disregard entries without call signs or real
landing times. In rare cases where no seat configuration was available, we estimate the
number of seats as the average of all recorded flights with the same aircraft model (or the
average over all aircraft models if no other similar model was recorded).
Airport demand. We estimate the demand for ride-hailing services as proportional
to the number of seats of all arriving airplanes (implying a constant fraction of potential
Uber customers). To create a continuous time series from the discrete arrival events of
individual airplanes we compute a five minute moving average to create equidistant records
every minute. This also slightly reduces the strong variations between minutes with and
without arrivals.
Because we have much more frequent but not equally spaced data for the Uber price
estimates, we use the same procedure and compute a five minute moving average of the
surge fee for every minute. This leaves us with the same granularity of the data as for the
deplanements.
Using these data, we compute the cross-correlation between the Uber surge fee estimates
and the deplanement data at the corresponding airport. In Fig. 1c we show the scatterplot
at the timelag (deplanement earlier than surge) where this correlation is maximal for the
illustrated window from 20:00 to 02:00 of the surge fee.
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Comparison of surge dynamics. To compare and characterize the surge dynamics
for different trips we normalize the absolute surge fee time series by the base cost at that
time, yielding an effective surge factor. For these normalized time series, we compute the
per minute changes ∆p between consecutive time points (time t in minutes),
∆p(t) =
total fare(t)
base cost(t)
− total fare(t− 1)
base cost(t− 1) (6)
=
surge fee(t)
base cost(t)
− surge fee(t− 1)
base cost(t− 1) .
To quantify and compare the statistical properties of the surge factor time series we
split the price changes into three contributions. We take any data point with ∆p2 < 10−7
to belong to a Dirac delta distribution at zero (not shown in the histograms) and fit a
Gaussian mixture model with two Gaussian distributions to the remaining data. Taking
both distributions to have a mean of zero (no price change on average) yields
Prob (∆p) = w0 δ(∆p)
+ wbase
1√
2piσ2main
e
− ∆p2
2σ2
base
+ wsurge
1√
2piσ2surge
e
− ∆p2
2σ2surge
where the weight wsurge defines the surge contribution and the standard deviation σsurge is
the normalized surge strength used to characterize the surge dynamics.
Two player game – minimal theoretical model. The results presented in the
manuscript (Fig. 2B) are obtained with normalized parameters pbase = 1 and δ ∈ {0, 0.15, 0.30},
allowing up to pmaxsurge = 1/0.30 ≈ 3.33 before no customer orders a ride at the maximum
surge fee. See Supplementary Material for a detailed description.
Dynamic multiplayer game. For the dynamic multiplayer game, we consider a single
origin location with N = 160 drivers. Upon completing a trip, drivers return to the origin
location after a total round-trip time ts uniformly distributed in [〈ts〉 − 5, 〈ts〉+ 5] minutes.
We increase the round-trip time from the base value 〈ts〉 = 30 minutes to 〈ts〉 = 60 minutes
in the morning and afternoon (starting at 08:00 and increasing linearly up to the maximum
at 9:30 and back to the base value until 11:00. Similarly in the afternoon from 15:00 to the
maximum at 18:00 and back until 20:00).
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The base cost pbase depend linearly on the round-trip time as pbase = 1 + 〈ts〉 /2 ∈ [16, 31]
USD as the round-trip time changes during day. Similar to the two-player game, we take a
linear price dependence for the surge pricing as
p′(t) =
pbase if Nidle(t) ≥ Nthreshpbase + pmaxsurge (1− Nidle(t)Nthres ) else
based on the number Nidle of online drivers at the trip origin and the number of drivers Nthresh
before the surge fee becomes non-zero. We take Nthresh = λ 〈ts〉, where λ = 2 requests per
minute describes the demand modeled as a Poisson process in time. We model responses of
the price to the current system state (number of available drivers and round-trip time) as
instantaneous.
The behavior of customers and drivers is as follows: Each customer i is assigned a uni-
formly random maximum price pmax,i ∈ [pbase, pmax] they are willing to pay, where we take
the price of Uber Black as pmax = 54 USD. When the customer makes a request, they check
the current total fare. If the current total fare is smaller than pmax,i, the customer orders
the ride. If the total fare is higher or no drivers are online and idle, the customer waits and
checks again every 2 minutes. After 10 minutes without ordering a ride, the customer leaves
the system.
At every point in time the drivers decide whether to switch their app off or on. They
make this decision based on the (mean field) optimal strategy to optimize their collective
payoff. A driver switches off their app only if two conditions are fulfilled: first, if there
are sufficiently many drivers available and willing to be offline to induce a non-zero surge
fee. Second, if the price is less than the (mean field) optimal value for the drivers given
the current system state. Each driver remains offline for at most 20 minutes. After this
time, the driver only considers going offline again after serving a customer (drivers try to
obtain similar individual profits whereas their optimal strategy based on maximizing their
collective profit would be for some drivers to be always offline).
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Appendix
accompanying the manuscript
Anomalous supply shortages from dynamic pricing in on-demand mobility
In the main manuscript we illustrate how inherent incentives of dynamic pricing induce
anomalous supply dynamics and artificial price surges in ride-hailing services. We show
that the incentives driving these dynamics are generic to dynamic pricing schemes and
analyze the specific conditions that promote them. Based on confirmed reports of these
non-equilibrium dynamics at Reagan National Airport (DCA) in Washington, D.C. [17],
we identify locations with similar surge fee dynamics from Uber price estimates for trips
originating from 63 airports around the globe as well as 23 convention centers, 12 train
stations and 39 city trips in North America (largely US).
In this Supplementary Material we provide additional details on all analyses and results
presented in the main manuscript. This document is structured as follows:
S1. Dynamic pricing in ride-hailing
We explain Uber’s dynamic pricing model and isolate the surge fee component influenced
by supply and demand imbalances. We give a detailed comparison of the surge activity to
the estimated demand at DCA and other airports.
S2. Statistical properties of surge pricing
We compare the surge fee dynamics of all recorded price estimates to identify locations with
similar surge activity to DCA that may be driven by anomalous supply dynamics.
S3. Incentive structure for drivers under dynamic pricing
We explain the incentives that determine the action of drivers under dynamic pricing in a
simplified game-theoretic setting.
S4. Data - methodology and details
We provide a detailed explanation of data collection and summarize our data processing
approach.
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DYNAMIC PRICING IN RIDE-HALING
Dynamic pricing is a general mechanism to adjust prices to time-varying conditions. Ap-
plication of dynamic pricing schemes are widespread in online retail and used, for example,
by Amazon [13], and is of increasing importance in transportation contexts, too. In partic-
ular for ride-hailing services, where service conditions may vary strongly over the day due
to weather, special events or simply rush hour and congestion, many service providers apply
dynamic pricing [15, 16].
Uber Technologies Inc. is a major ride-hailing platform operator that matches drivers
with customers requesting transportation in 795 metropolitan areas worldwide (as of July
2019 [33], Fig. S5). The company operates a digital marketplace for transportation services
where riders voice their demand for a specific trip and drivers offer to deliver the service. The
dynamic pricing scheme employed by Uber includes both an adaptive trip fee, based on local
traffic conditions and similar parameters, as well as an additional component to balance the
spatio-temporal distribution of demand and supply in the operating area, commonly denoted
as surge pricing [16, 20].
In this section, we detail the different components of the pricing mechanism and isolate
how they impact the evolution of the recorded price estimate time series.
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Uber presence City sample
FIG. S5. Uber ride-hailing services around the world. Blue markers indicate all cities where
price estimate time series have been recorded out of all locations where Uber service is available
(grey). In some locations, especially in the US, we recorded price estimates for multiple different
trips in the same location (see Tab. S2 in section for details).
Uber’s price model
Uber’s dynamic pricing model consists of four different fee categories[40]:
• Pickup fee: cost for customer pick-up from the requested origin point of the trip.
Pickup fees contain a base fare (flat fee per pick-up) and may be subject to additional
long-pickup fees if drivers and customers are far away from one another, e.g. when
requesting a ride from a remote location. Long-pickup fees apply if the pickup duration
exceeds a pre-defined threshold value (e.g. 10 minutes in many US cities), and is
charged for certain Uber products in selected operating areas only.
Long-pickup fees are calculated based on the distance and time the driver has to invest
to pick up the customer, and is bound from above by a maximum pickup fee. Price
per minute and price per mile parameters determine the absolute amount of the fee.
Pickup fee = base fare + long-pickup fees (optional)
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Input parameters : base fare, price per minute (optional), pickup duration (optional),
price per mile (optional), pickup distance (optional)
• Trip fees: cost for the passenger transportation component of the ride.
Trip fees consist of a fixed booking fee as well as variable per minute and per mile
prices. The trip fee is lower bounded by the minimum fare parameter.
Trip fee = booking fee + distance fee + time fee
Input parameters : booking fare, price per minute, trip duration, price per mile, trip
distance, minimum fare
• Surcharges: optional add-on fees for the specific type of ride.
Surcharges may reflect additional fees such as tolls, airport pickup fees, tip, . . . , and
thus depend on the trip specifics.
Surcharges = tolls + airport pickup fees + . . .
Input parameters : tolls (optional), airport pickup fees (optional), tip (optional), . . .
• Surge fee: supply- and demand-based cost increment.
Surge fees consider the spatio-temporal distribution of ride requests and available
drivers. They reflect a price increment on trip and base fares, either in terms of a
surge multiplier or as an additive surge component that is intended to rebalance local
demand and supply [20, 35].
Input parameters : Unknown. Uber’s surge pricing algorithm is not public.
The total fare for the ride is the sum of these four components
total fare = pickup fee + trip fee + surcharges︸ ︷︷ ︸ + surge fee
= base cost + surge fee , (S7)
which we denote as trip dependent base cost and supply-demand dependent surge fee.
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Depending on the city, the values of the input parameters for the different price compo-
nents may vary. Moreover, Uber offers different products that differ by their level of service,
and have different input parameters to the pricing model. In our analysis, we focus on
the standard service and, for comparison, a corresponding premium service available in the
region:
• Standard service: UberX, UberGO (India)
• Premium service: Black, Berline (France), Exec (Great Britain), Lux, Premier
(India) or Select (Egypt, Argentina)
More details can be found in the data collection section at the end of this Supplementary
Material. For all data presented in this section UberX and Black are available and re-
sults are based on price estimates for these services. Table S1 gives an exemplary overview
of several parameter values serving as inputs to the Uber price mechanism for four US cities.
Washington D.C. Los Angeles San Francisco Houston
Black UberX Black UberX Black UberX Black UberX
Pickup fees
Base fare [USD] 7.75 1.21 8.75 0.00 8.75 2.20 7.75 1.00
Long-pickup fee [USD] - Variable - Variable - Variable - Variable
- Price per minute [USD] - 0.30 - 0.28 - 0.39 - 0.17
- Price per mile [USD] - 0.80 - 0.80 - 0.91 - 0.80
Trip fees
Booking fee [USD] 0.00 2.00 0.00 2.30 0.00 2.20 0.00 2.90
Minimum fare [USD] 15.75 7.00 15.75 5.80 15.75 7.20 15.75 5.95
Price per minute [USD] 0.82 0.30 0.71 0.28 1.08 0.39 1.03 0.17
Price per mile [USD] 2.20 0.80 2.92 0.80 2.73 0.91 2.20 0.80
Surcharges Airport pickup fee 4.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 N/A N/A 0.00 2.75
Surge fee Supply/demand balance N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
TABLE S1. Input parameter values determining Uber prices differ per product and
locality. Price parameters for Uber’s standard (UberX ) and premium (Black) ride-hailing services
in four exemplary US cities [34].
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Time series of Uber price estimates
Figure S6a shows price estimate time series for four exemplary trips originating from air-
ports in Washington, D.C. (DCA), San Francisco (SFO), Los Angeles (LAX) and Houston
(IAH) for Uber Black and UberX over the time span of 24 hours. Trip fares change dynam-
ically in all of the four cities and exhibit a slow and fast timescale of price volatility. While
the slow dynamics modulates the price in timescales of several hours, the fast timescale
adds price spikes in the order of ten minutes to half an hour. Here, we isolate the different
contributions from pickup fees, trip fees, surge fee, and surcharges to the price evolution.
The price dynamics shown in Fig. S6a is driven by trip fees (see Fig. S6b) and surge fees
(see Fig. S6c) which vary over time. We assume that pickup fees and surcharges are constant
for all time series analyzed. Possible exceptions include tolls which apply during the day
but not at night or are applicable only on alternative routes (e.g. for IAH). However, these
surcharges are typically small and change over very long timescales (∼ 12 hour) and do not
significantly alter the observed surge dynamics.
Trip fees vary as a function of intra-day variation in local traffic conditions in each of the
four cities. Two effects superimpose: On the one hand, trip duration estimates change as the
streets from the different airports to the respective inner-city destinations become congested
during commuting and business hours (see Fig. S7 for trip duration estimates). Hence,
the time-dependent trip fee increases and decreases over the course of the day proportional
to the street flow traffic conditions. On the other hand, route choice recommendations
change as a function of the current traffic conditions. As traffic intensifies, alternative
routes may become faster and thus more attractive to complete the trip. However, those
trip duration-preferable routes might be longer compared to the shortest-distance path,
implying higher distant-dependent trip fees (see Fig. S7, note in particular DCA, where the
trip distance increases only when the trip duration is large.). Together, both contributions
define the time-dependent trip fee component of the total fare estimate. Trip duration
and distance estimates are identical for both Uber Black and UberX. Hence, their trip fees
evolve synchronously, though with different per-minute and per-mile charges (see Fig. S6b
and Tab. S1).
In Fig. S6 (right column) we subtract pickup fees, trip fees and (estimated constant)
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surcharges from the price estimate time series to isolate the time evolution of the surge
fee component (see section for more details). For Uber Black, there is almost no surge
activity at DCA, LAX or IAH over the illustrated time span of 24 hours. Similarly, SFO
does not exhibit Uber Black price surges for most of the day, but only a single distinctive
surge at 00:30. Hence, we assume that the marketplace for Uber Black is in equilibrium at
all airports, and there are no stark spatio-temporal supply and demand imbalances.
For UberX, the surge fee dynamics differs substantially. At DCA, we observe substantial
surge activity for most of the day. Only for four hours at night time the marketplace does not
give rise to surge fees (consistent with the typically low demand for transportation during
this time window. Longer price surges exist for approximately 1.5 hours during morning
(07:30 to 09:00) and 3.5 hours during evening commuting hours (16:00 to 19:30). It is
plausible that these price surges supplement the typical high commuting demand during rush
hour. Additionally, the dynamic pricing mechanism induces a series of short, characteristic,
almost periodic surges with approximately universal peak value of ten USD and duration
of 20 minutes that appear between 19:00 and 03:00. Similar surge dynamics with short,
repeated surges are clearly visible at SFO between 18:00 and 23:00, possibly between 23:30
and 01:30 at LAX, but not at IAH.
Given the long-term presence of Uber in any of these cities (launch dates: San Francisco
in May 2010, Los Angeles in March 2010, Washington, D.C. in December 2011 and Houston
in February 2014 [36]) and the difficulty for the drivers to operate economically sustainable
in a market with too many competitors for given demand, it is reasonable to assume that the
different marketplaces are equilibrated with respect to long term fluctuations. In fact, the
Uber Black surge dynamics supports this hypothesis and even suggest equilibration down
to small, intra-day timescales, with drivers having adjusted to when and where to work
efficiently. In contrast, the repeated, sudden surges of UberX indicate out-of-equilibrium
dynamics. Counter-intuitively, the dynamic pricing mechanism seems to prevent the system
from settling into an equilibrium.
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dFIG. S6. Uber Black and UberX trip fees evolve synchronously while the respective
surge fees do not. a-d Fare estimates for UberX (blue) and Uber Black (red) on 19/06/04 for
trips originating from Reagan National Airport, Washington, D.C. (DCA), Los Angeles Interna-
tional Airport (LAX), San Francisco International Airport (SFO) and George Bush Intercontinental
Airport, Houston (IAH). Columns show total fare, base cost and surge fee, respectively (from left
to right).
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FIG. S7. Uber trip fees change proportional to city traffic flow conditions. UberX
base cost change intra-day at a DCA, b LAX, c SFO and d IAH (data from 19/06/04, compare
Fig. S6) as trip fees adapt to latest estimates for trip duration (blue) and distance (red). Both
estimates respond to changing traffic conditions, congestion and dynamic route choice. During
commuting hours rising trip duration estimates reflect congested streets, while changes in trip
distance estimates correspond to alternative route choice advise as the fastest route option changes
for given traffic conditions. Uber Black trip fees behave qualitatively identically (compare Fig. S6)
since they are based on the same duration and distance estimates.
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Demand model
Possible origins for the surge dynamics are either local fluctuations in the demand (i.e.
many customers requesting a ride at the same time) or changes in the supply (i.e. few
available drivers). While driver induced price surges are confirmed to occur at DCA [17], we
do not know which, if any, of the observed peaks correspond to these artificial prices surges.
To identify parts of the surge fee time series that are likely caused by supply-side action, we
develop a demand model for Reagan National Airport (DCA) and assess to what extent it
explains the price dynamics observed in Fig. S6 (top right). In particular, we estimate the
demand based on historic airport taxi departures and recorded aircraft deplanements. We
find that a large part of the surge dynamics cannot be satisfactorily explained through the
demand model, suggesting that in particular the short, repeated surges in the evening are
primarily induced by changes of the supply.
Historic taxi trip records: Uber’s ride-hailing service operates in the same niche as tra-
ditional taxi services. According to the Department For-Hire Vehicles, four of Washington
D.C.’s large ride-hailing companies (HopSkipDrive, Lyft, Uber and Via) generated 45% of
the combined taxicab and ride-hailing tax revenues in 2016, 59% in 2017 and 67% in 2018
[37]. As the absolute amount of those tax revenues remained approximately constant over
the three years (2016: 6.75 million USD, 2017: 7.65 million USD, 2018: 7.19 million USD),
ride-hailing companies kept on gaining market share from traditional taxi providers, under-
pinning that digital ride-hailing and traditional taxi services are substitutes. This suggests
that taxis and ride-hailing services serve a similar demand and recorded taxi trips departing
from DCA likely reflect the typical intra-day demand also for ride-hailing services.
Figure S8 shows the average intra-day taxi demand evolution for trips originating from
DCA airport, calculated for trips from January to August in 2017. and, interestingly, do
not reflect the rush hour traffic observed in Fig. S7. In particular on Monday, Tuesday and
Wednesday the average demand is approximately constant over the whole day with 1.85
rides per minute (standard deviation 0.37 rides per minute). Higher demand in the evening
at other days may strengthen price surges during that time but no specific correspondence
between taxi demand and the dynamics of the surge fee is visible.
Overall, there seems to be no direct influence of the general demand evolution on the
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surge fees, consistent with our assumption of an equilibrated market on these timescales.
However, the information about events of a specific day is lost by considering average historic
demand data. Events of an individual day may reveal more direct correlations between the
demand and the surge fee. In the following, we therefore attempt to match the surge fee
with the demand (aircraft arrivals) of the respective day.
FIG. S8. Average demand for taxi trips from DCA is approximately constant during
the day. Average number of taxi departures per minute from DCA recorded between 17/01/02-
17/08/27. a From Monday to Wednesday, the average demand during business hours is approxi-
mately constant at 1.85 taxi rides per minute (dashed black line). b,c Thursday through Sunday
show a slightly higher demand in the evening. In general, larger fluctuations typically occur over
one to two hours. Details on data processing can be found in section .
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Aircraft passenger arrivals: The taxi trips analyzed above only provide the average
demand across many days. However, the surge dynamics of a specific day depend on the
demand due to the specific arrival pattern of airplanes on that day.
Passengers arrive in DCA with each aircraft deplanement. Some of these passenger
may continue on a connecting flight while the remainder likely travels in the direction of
Washington, D.C., using for example ride-hailing services like Uber or taxi cabs. Taking a
homogeneous load factor and a constant share of Uber customers across all arriving planes,
we expect the demand for ride-hailing services to be proportional to the seat capacity of the
arriving aircraft. Figure S9a shows the time series of the UberX surge fee together with the
corresponding capacity of arriving aircraft (compare DCA, Fig. S6).
The capacity of arriving aircraft follows a similar pattern to the average taxi demand
above. At nighttime almost no deplanements are observed, in agreement with the DCA
Nighttime Noise Rule. Over the course of the day, DCA handles a near constant stream
of aircraft landings, in line with the approximately constant demand for taxi service. De-
planements occur with a median interval of 2 minutes with aircraft equipped with with 50
to 213 seats. On average, 32 passengers arrive in DCA per minute, a fraction of which will
use ride-hailing serivces.
To estimate the influence of the arrivals on the surge dynamics, we compute the normal-
ized cross-correlation function
ρ(∆t) =
E [(S(t)− 〈S(t)〉) (A(t+ ∆t)− 〈A(t+ ∆t)〉]
σS(t)σA(t+ ∆t)
(S8)
between fixed windows of the UberX surge fee S(t) and the capacity of arriving airplanes
A(t) with time lag ∆t. E[·] denotes the expectation value of the argument and σS and
σA denote the standard deviation of the respective time series in the corresponding time
window. For more details on the data preparation and processing see section .
To avoid high correlations simply due to the significant night-day differences in both
airplane arrivals and ride-hailing demand, we calculate the cross-correlation ρ(∆t) only for
time windows between 08:00 and 02:00 on the next morning
• 6-hour windows : We analyze morning time windows between 08:00 to 14:00 (Fig. S9b,
yellow lines), afternoon time windows from 14:00 to 20:00 (green lines), and evening
time windows from 20:00 to 02:00 (blue lines).
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FIG. S9. Capacity of arriving aircraft is only weakly correlated with UberX surge
fees. a UberX surge fee (top) and capacity of arriving airplanes (bottom) at DCA on Tuesday,
19/06/04. b Normalized cross-correlation ρ(∆t) between fixed time windows of the surge fee and
the capacity of arriving aicraft. The dark blue line corresponds to the shaded window from 20:00
to 02:00 in panel a, light blue lines to the same time windows on other days. Yellow lines show
the correlation function for the 6-hour time window from 08:00 to 14:00, green lines for the 6-hour
time windows from 14:00 to 20:00. Grey lines show 12- and 18-hour windows (dotted line: 08:00
to 20:00.; dotted-dashed line: 14:00 to 02:00; solid: 08:00 to 02:00). The maximum correlation
ρ(∆t∗) = 0.31 for the highlighted time window is obtained at ∆t∗ = −5 minutes (red point). c
Surge fee and aircraft capacity at the time lag ∆t∗ of maximum correlation (red point in panel
b). There is no apparent relationship between the arrivals and the surge fee, suggesting a large
supply-side influence on the observed surge dynamics.
• 12-hour windows : We contrast the 6-hour time widows with half-day daytime windows
between 08:00 to 20:00 (Fig. S9b dotted gray lines) and late-afternoon to nighttime
windows between 14:00 to 02:00 (dotted-dashed gray lines)
• 18-hour windows : Furthermore, we define an 18-hour time window between 08:00 to
02:00 extending over the full time span of surge activity (Fig. S9b solid gray lines).
In particular, we focus on the correlation of the 6-hour evening time window from 20:00 to
02:00 (see Fig. S9, shaded in panel a, dark blue line in panel b), where the trip fee is constant
and we expect no influence of traffic conditions on the surge fee. In this time window, we
observe repeated peaks of the surge fee and supply-induced price surges are known to occur
[17].
34
FIG. S10. Weak correlations between airport arrivals and surge fee across airports.
The time series of aircraft arrivals and UberX surge fees for a Brussels, b Warsaw, c Chennai and
d San Francisco (top two rows). The third row shows the cross-correlation (Pearson correlation
coefficient) ρ between the surge fee time series and the arrivals at different delays ∆t using the
same approach as for DCA (compare Fig. S9). The bottom row shows the surge fee vs. the number
of arrivals plot at the delay ∆t∗ of the largest cross-correlation. As in Fig. S9c, the correlation
between arrivals and surge fee is weak most of the time.
The first maximum of the cross-correlation function is obtained for a time lag of
∆t∗ = −5 minutes at a value of ρ(∆t∗) = 0.31, indicating only a weak direct influence
of aircraft arrivals on surge dynamics. Several similar maxima of the correlation correspond
to the 30 to 40 minute periodicity of the surges in this time window. In contrast, this
periodicity is not reflected in the aircraft arrivals. On other days, the correlation reaches up
to ρ(∆t∗) ≈ 0.39 in the same time window. The correlation at ∆t∗ = −5 minutes may be
explained by passengers hailing a ride or checking prices very quickly after landing, possibly
while taxiing to the gate or immediately after exiting the plane.[41] However, a scatter
plot at the time lag of the maximum correlation reveals no clear relationship between the
surge fee and aircraft arrivals (see Fig S9c). Results for other time windows are similarly
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ambiguous, showing only weak correlation between the two time series and offering no clear
explanation of the surge dynamics. Therefore, the variability of aircraft arrivals only par-
tially explains the surge dynamics. Other demand sources apart from aircraft arrivals seem
unlikely at DCA. While we assumed a constant airplane load (fraction of occupied seats),
we expect this factor to vary at most on the timescale of several hours with a typical daily
pattern rather than on short timescales like the surge dynamics. Overall, we conclude that
changes in ride-hailing demand do not offer a sufficient explanation for the observed surge
dynamics. There must be additional, unobserved changes of supply affecting the surge fee.
36
Conclusion. The taxi and airport data analyzed above indicate an approximately con-
stant demand during the day with no direct correspondence between demand changes and
surge dynamics. Taxi data show a generally higher average demand during the evening, sug-
gesting that price surges may be more likely during this time. Aircraft arrivals show weak
correlation with the surge fee, offering only a partial explanation of the surge dynamics.
Unrelated to direct demand fluctuations, we consider other sources for demand and supply
changes. Specifically, longer service times during rush hour (compare Fig. S7) not only lead
to higher trip fees but also to drivers spending more time serving each request. With a
constant demand (compare taxi departures in Fig. S8), this means more drivers are busy
and fewer drivers are available at a given time during this period. This general mechanism
for supply shortages as a secondary effect of prolonged heavy traffic is consistent with the
observed long duration price surges during main commuting times.
In summary, we only have a satisfactory explanation for the long rush hour peaks of the
surge fee at DCA. The short, repeated, almost periodic surges with universal peak value and
duration (in particular in the evening between 19:00 and 03:00, see Fig. S6, top right) cannot
be explained by demand-side fluctuations alone or general demand and traffic conditions. We
therefore consider these peaks as supply-side induced (or at least having a strong supply-side
influence), consistent with the reported driver-induced price surges at DCA in the evening
[17]. In the following, we attempt to find price time series with similar out-of-equilibrium
surge dynamics to identify locations that may also be affected by artificially induced price
surges.
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STATISTICAL PROPERTIES OF SURGE PRICING
Price surges reflect the imbalance of supply and demand at the origin location at the
time of a given request. In the previous section, we have identified patterns of the surge
dynamics in DCA that are likely related to artificial supply manipulation (compare DCA,
Fig. S6) [17]. In the examples presented before, however, we also observe locations without
surge activity (compare IAH, Fig. S6). Different locations around the globe exhibit different
price dynamics, some without any price surges, some with single, distinct surge peaks and
others with large, frequent surges similar to those observed in DCA (Fig. S11 and S12).
In this section, we attempt to characterize the out-of-equilibrium surge dynamics by
quantifying properties of the price surges and the price time series at all observed locations
(Fig. S5) and aim to identify cities with artificial price surges by comparing their surge
dynamics to those observed at DCA.
We approach the problem of identifying price surges and quantifying the surge dynamics
of locations from two different directions. First, we attempt to identify individual surge peaks
directly. Second, we consider the distribution of the price changes across the whole price
time series and identify two distinct contributions to the price dynamics, isolating changes
corresponding to the surge fee component of the price changes in cities exhibiting price
surges. While we find no clear distinction between locations with and without price surges
or with and without potentially artificially induced price surges, we find several locations
with similar or more volatile surge dynamics than DCA.
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FIG. S11. The evolution of total fares for standard UberX services differs qualitatively
across locations. Sample of total fare dynamics over a time span of 24 hours for rides originating
from airports (top two rows), train stations (third and fourth row) and convention centers (bottom
row) in different cities illustrating the range of possible price dynamics. Trip characteristics can be
found in the data section and in Tab. S2. All currencies were converted to USD using the exchange
rates for the respective day provided by the European Central Bank.
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FIG. S12. The evolution of surge fees for standard UberX services differs qualitatively
across locations. Estimated surge fee for the trip samples shown in Fig. S11. The surge fee
shows a similarly broad range of dynamics as the total fare. All currencies were converted to USD
using the exchange rates for the respective day provided by the European Central Bank.
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FIG. S13. The normalized surge fees for standard UberX services enables comparison
of the surge dynamics across locations. Estimated normalized surge fee (surge fee divided by
base cost) for the trip samples shown in Fig. S11. The normalized surge fee effectively represents
a surge factor. Using this representation, the dynamics at different locations become comparable
independent of the absolute cost of the trip (e.g. trip distance or local currency). In particular,
differences between locations with and without price surges become clearer.
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Statistics of individual surge peaks
In order to identify individual surge peaks, we consider the surge fee component SX(t) of
the total UberX fare, compare Fig. S12. To compare different locations with varying total
fare, we normalize the surge fee by the base cost at the current time, resulting in a surge factor
sX(t) describing the relative increase of the price due to price surges (compare Fig. S13). In
order to filter surges due to overall demand increase, we subtract the corresponding premium
service surge factor sprem (e.g. of Uber Black), resulting in a normalized surge factor
s˜X =
surge feeUberX(t)
base costUberX(t)
− surge feeBlack(t)
base costBlack(t)
. (S9)
We use the premium products as a reference value since they tend to exhibit price surges
only on rare occasions, presumably at times of generally high demand.
Using this normalized surge factor, we define a surge by values s˜X > 0.2, that means a
surge starts when s˜X increases above 0.2. To avoid peaks repeatedly ending and beginning
due to small fluctuations, we define the end of a surge as the first time s˜X decreases again to
below 0.1. Using different (reasonable) threshold values gives qualitatively similar results.
These peaks are well described by boxes with start and end times defined by the peak
identification conditions above and height given by the maximum value of the normalized
surge factor during the peak. An example is illustrated in Fig. S14.
We use the identified surges to compute aggregate characteristics of the surge dynamics
for each location (see data section and Tab. S2 for details). In particular we consider the
mean duration and height of the peaks as well as the average number of peaks. Figure S15a-c
shows the resulting statistics for each city by rank. The distinction between locations with
and without peaks is clear only in the average peak height (Fig. S15b) due to the non-zero
threshold used for peak identification. When peaks were identified at a location, neither
the average duration, height nor number of peaks clearly separate locations with few or
many or with strong or weak price surges. All measures change steadily across the different
locations. Also the combination of these features (see Fig. S15d for an example) does not
reveal distinct groups of locations.
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FIG. S14. Surge peak detection. Visualization of the surge peak identification for the normalized
surge factor s˜X, Eq. (S9, in DCA. Peaks are defined to start when s˜X > 0.2 (dotted green line)
and end when s˜X < 0.1 (dashed red line). Their amplitude is taken as the maximum value of s˜X
during the peak (solid black rectangles).
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FIG. S15. Single peak statistics do not separate locations with qualitatively different
surge dynamics. None of the average peak characteristics (a number of peaks, b height, c dura-
tion] clearly classifies the cities with price surges into different categories, all measures gradually
change from high to low values. The measures only distinguish between cities with peaks from
those where no peaks where identified (e.g. panel b due to the threshold s˜X = 0.2 used for peak
identification). d Combining the average peak count per day and the average peak duration also
reveals no clear pattern (results are qualitatively the same for other combinations of observables).
Some locations with extremely long lasting surges (compare panel c) with an average peak duration
upwards of 80 minutes are not visible in d (Orange County Convention Center, San Francisco City
Trip 5, San Francisco City Trip 9, Minneapolis Convention Center). The long lasting price surges
suggest a general supply-demand imbalance in these locations rather than artificially induced price
surges, similar to the sustained rush-hour surge peaks in DCA (compare Fig. S6). No dependence
on the trip type (airport, station, city or convention) is visible.
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Statistics of surge time series
In order to better characterize at which locations repeated price surges occur, we consider
statistics of the entire price time series instead of individual price surge peaks. In particular,
we consider per minute changes in the normalized price to identify the typical timescales of
the price dynamics.
For the analysis described in this section, we use a smoothed time series of normalized
prices, i.e. the total fare divided by base cost, measuring the price in fractions of the time
dependent base cost with equally spaced data points every minute (see also data processing
section ). For these normalized time series, we compute the per minute changes ∆p between
consecutive time points,
∆p(t) =
total fare(t)
base cost(t)
− total fare(t− 1)
base cost(t− 1) (S10)
=
base cost(t) + surge fee(t)
base cost(t)
− base cost(t− 1) + surge fee(t− 1)
base cost(t− 1) .
=
surge fee(t)
base cost(t)
− surge fee(t− 1)
base cost(t− 1) .
The normalized price can be interpreted as an effective surge factor (compare previous
section). Although Uber began to transition to an additive surge computation [20, 35], this
normalization is necessary to compare price estimates across different locations regardless
of base cost, currency or sampling frequency. Note that even in locations without surge
activity, the estimated surge fee is not exactly zero, likely due to rounding of the price
estimates. Taking into account these small fluctuations, we expect there to be three major
contributions to the relative price changes: (i) Minutes without any change, e.g. during
night where traffic and demand conditions do not change at all. (ii) Small changes due the
rounding of the price estimate and slow changes of the base cost, mostly driven by changes
of the trip fare as traffic conditions change over multiple hours. (iii) Fast changes of the
surge fee component, increasing the price by up to 80% in a matter of minutes.
In order to quantify the contribution of these three parts, we fit an extended Gaussian
mixture model to the data, consisting of one Dirac-delta distribution and two Gaussian
distributions modelling the three contributions described above. We take the mean of both
Gaussians to be zero (no price change on average), such that
Prob (∆p) = w0 δ(∆p) + wbase
1√
2piσ2base
e
− ∆p2
2σ2
base + wsurge
1√
2piσ2surge
e
− ∆p2
2σ2surge (S11)
45
where we define the second Gaussian corresponding to the surge fee component to be
broader, σsurge > σbase. We take all datapoints with ∆p
2 < 10−7 to belong to the Dirac-
delta distribution indicating no price change and fit the two Gaussian distributions to the
remaining data to determine the weights and standard deviations. A broad distribution
corresponds to a fast changing behaviour (surge fee), while a narrow distribution describes
a slowly changing price (base cost). For better visibility we only show the reduced data
without the data points with no price change in the following, corresponding to the two
Gaussian distributions without the Dirac delta distribution.
Fig. S16 shows the resulting distribution of the price changes at different locations without
the Dirac-delta distribution. As expected, for all locations we find a large number of small
changes, corresponding to small fluctuations of the base cost and rounding errors of the
price estimates. Locations exhibiting price surges, like DCA, SFO and LAX, additionally
have many larger price changes, corresponding to the dynamics of the surge fee. In contrast,
locations without surge activity (LHR, CDG, BRU) have a very narrow distribution.
For the data shown in Fig. S16, we find base cost fuctuations characterized by σbase ≈
0.003 whereas the relative price changes corresponding to the surge fee component (when
they are different from the vase cost fluctuations) are characterized by σsurge ≈ 0.05. When
price surges do not exist, the relative price change distribution is typically well described by
a single Gaussian such that the estimated values for σbase and σsurge are more similar.
To validate these observations, we compute the relative price changes also for Uber Black
at Reagan National Airport (DCA) in Washington D.C. Comparing the resulting distribu-
tions for UberX and Uber Black (see Fig. S17) shows that changes of the Uber Black price
are well described by only the base cost fluctuations. This is consistent with the observation
that the trip fare evolves synchronously for UberX and Uber Black but only UberX exhibits
significant surge activity (compare Fig. S6 above).
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FIG. S16. Relative price change distributions differ between locations with and without
surge activity. The relative price change distribution from the normalized UberX price time series
for different locations (blue histogram, see text). All locations show a narrow peak corresponding to
slow changes of the base cost and small rounding errors of the price estimate (base cost fluctuations,
blue line). Locations where price surges are prevalent (e.g. WAW, BOM in the top row) show
a second part of the distribution, characterizing the larger and faster price changes during price
surges (orange line). The orange and blue lines indicate the individual distributions of the Gaussian
mixture model fit Eq. (S11).
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FIG. S17. Uber Black price changes are well described by only base cost fluctuations.
Distribution of the relative price changes at the Reagan National Airport (DCA) for UberX (blue)
and Uber Black (red, higher values due to normalization of he probability distribution). The
Gaussian distribution corresponding to the base cost fluctuations of UberX approximately matches
the price dynamics of Uber Black, illustrating that these are base cost fluctuations unrelated to
surge activity.
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Based on these observations, we attempt to quantify the surge dynamics at different
locations. If the estimated σsurge is large, the price time series of that location likely exhibits
price surges. The absolute value of σsurge characterizes the strength of the surges, the weight
wsurge quantifies the overall contribution of surge dynamics to the price behaviour, similar to
the average number of surge peaks in the previous section. Note that in locations without
surge activity, the estimated standard deviation of both distributions is similar and the
weights are becoming more and more interchangeable. In the limit of σmain = σsurge, all
combinations of weights are indistinguishable.
Figure S18 shows a scatter-plot of the time series statistics illustrating the magnitude
σsurge (normalized surge strength, large values indicate strong price surges, small values
indicate no surge activity) and the weight wsurge (surge contribution, large values of wsurge
indicate many price surges, small values indicate few surges). Also in this representation,
the data do not separate into distinct clusters. However, we clearly identify several locations
where both σsurge and wsurge are large (top right in Fig. S18), including DCA (Washington
D.C.), LAX (Los Angeles), WAW (Warsaw) and Pennsylvania Station (Manhattan, New
York City). Prices in these locations show strong, highly volative surge activity similar to
DCA, suggesting artificial causes for at least some of the price surges observed there.
We also find a large number of locations with a broad distribution, σsurge ≥ 0.03, but
small weight wsurge ≤ 0.3, including SFO (San Francisco) and most city trips in Manhattan,
San Francisco and Washington, D.C.. These locations typically exhibit strong but infrequent
price surges, some of which may be induced artificially. In particular for city trips, frequently
organizing artificial surges is more difficult due to no central location where all drivers meet.
Some of these locations may also exhibit a few long duration surge peaks caused by periods
of high traffic and congestion or be affected by price surges at close by airports or other
points of interest (e.g. city trips in the same city).
Interestingly, all 12 observed train station trips exhibit relatively large σsurge ≥ 0.03.
Here, it is plausible that arriving trains cause larger increases in demand, as trains can carry
more passengers than planes and the time to leave the train and book a ride is likely more
homogeneous than for airplane travelers. While this higher demand increases the incentive to
induce a price surge (see game theoretic models below), it also offers a plausible demand-side
explanation for the price surges in these locations.
Finally, locations with σsurge ≤ 0.02 either do not exhibit price surges at all or only show
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FIG. S18. Price change distributions characterize the surge activity in different loca-
tions. a The main panel illustrates the weight wsurge (surge contribution) and the width σsurge
(normalized surge strength) of the broader distribution corresponding to the surge fee in the Gaus-
sian mixture model fit [Eq. (S11)] for all observed locations. No clear classification of the locations
is possible. However, we can distinguish three general regions. b and c, Small values of σsurge
indicate no surge activity as observed for example in JNB and BRU. Here, the distribution of rel-
ative price changes is well described by a single Gaussian corresponding to the base fare changes.
On the other hand, large values of σsurge signify fast and large price surges. d, If wsurge is small,
the surges are infrequent (compare panel for SFO). e, If wsurge is also large, these price surges
occur frequently, as shown for DCA. Several location (red ellipse) share similar characteristics of
the price change distribution.
minor price changes due to surge pricing. At these locations, including BRU (Brussels),
CDG (Paris) and LHR (London), no (artificial) price surges are induced. These include a
larger fraction of non-US locations (relative to all observed locations), likely due to different
local regulations legislating surge pricing and ride-hailing services. The value of wsurge is less
meaningful for these locations, as in many cases σsurge ≈ σbase and both distributions in the
mixture model are very similar.
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FIG. S19. Identifying non-equilibrium surge dynamics and anomalous supply dynamics.
Surge time series and price change statistics of all locations identified in Fig. S18 (red ellipse) that
we expect to exhibit anomalous surge behaviour (compare also Fig. 4 in the main manuscript).
Almost all identified locations show strong and frequent price surges. Exceptions are only Los
Angeles (middle row, right) and Lisbon (bottom row, middle).
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INCENTIVE STRUCTURE FOR DRIVERS UNDER DYNAMIC PRICING
By introducing dynamically adjustable prices, ride-hailing service providers create mo-
bility services that, in principle, feature a self-organized equilibration of spatio-temporal
demand and supply imbalances. Two groups of agents interact in such systems: customers
and drivers. While customers have demand for mobility services, drivers offer such ser-
vices against financial compensation. Price elasticities of demand and supply determine the
equilibrium price point. Here, we illustrate in detail the fundamental incentive structure
in dynamics pricing for drivers and how it may promote artificial supply shortages. First,
we provide the simplest possible game-theoretical model revealing demand and supply con-
stellations under which drivers collectively stimulate supply shortages. Second, we show
that it is socially desirable for groups of drivers to coordinate in a broad regime of demand
elasticities. Third, we reproduce the qualitative surge dynamics induced by collective action
among drivers in a simple dynamic model with stochastic passenger arrivals, including the
dynamics shown in Fig. 2 of the main manuscript.
Two-player game
Two-player game with inelastic demand
Consider a setting where the demand D for rides is inelastic and fixed. Customers are
insensitive to dynamic price changes and always agree to pay the current total fare to
accommodate their demand. Such an assumption may be justified for constellations where
business travelers have an urgent need to complete a trip in time, e.g. not to miss a business
meeting. Typically, employers reimburse their employees for the cost of travel. Hence,
business travelers have no incentive to prioritize their mobility demand based on the current
price structure but aim for making it on time to their business meeting irrespective of the
financial cost of mobility.
Drivers may benefit from such constellations in terms of higher payoffs if they manage
to stimulate dynamic price increases by creating an imbalance between demand and sup-
ply. Clearly, drivers can only affect the supply, i.e., increase the price by causing supply
shortages, not the demand. Specifically, drivers can choose to switch OFF their ride-hailing
mobile application to make their service temporarily unavailable. Thereby, they decrease
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the (observable) local supply S while demand D stays constant, making dynamic pricing
algorithms increase the price per ride. If drivers switch their mobile application ON again
and accept a customer’s trip request before the dynamic pricing algorithm readjusts trip
fares, drivers may secure higher payoffs. Note that the actually available supply of drivers
(e.g. the total number of drivers idling at the airport) never changes, the dynamic pricing
algorithm only reacts to an apparent supply shortage.
If D ≥ S all drivers benefit from this strategy. If D < S, drivers playing an OFF-
strategy risk that other drivers remain ONline. These ON-players may exploit their first
mover advantage in securing a ride and reduce the remaining demand for OFF-players.
Hence, drivers play a game about cooperation and defection, where cooperation corresponds
to the OFF-strategy and defection is the ON-strategy. Depending on price, supply and
demand, the game undergoes a transition from stag hunt or prisoner’s dilemma to a trivial
game promoting the creation of artificial supply shortages.
We capture this idea in the following two-player game with strategies ON/OFF for which
the drivers’ payoff structure is given by
ON OFF
ON ( D2 plow ,
D
2 plow ) ( pmid , (D − 1)pmid )
OFF ( (D − 1)pmid , pmid ) ( D2 phigh , D2 phigh )
with plow ≤ pmid ≤ phigh modelling dynamic pricing as the apparent supply changes. To
avoid case distinctions (each driver can serve a minimum of zero and a maximum of one
customer), we assume that the demand D is in the interval 1 ≤ D ≤ 2. The expected payoffs
shown in the payoff matrix assume a uniform probability to secure a ride from the currently
available trip demand across currently available drivers. For example, if both drivers remain
ON their respective payoff Π1, Π2 is
Π1(ON|ON) = D
2
plow
Π2(ON|ON) = D
2
plow , (S12)
where D/2 = D/S is the probability of securing a ride at the respective instance in time.
However, if one of the two switches their app OFF and the other remains ON, the probability
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of getting a ride shifts. The driver who remains ON has a first mover advantage because
none of the demand have been served yet. The demand D > 1 meets a current supply of
S − 1 = 1 and the dynamic pricing algorithm increases the price for a ride to pmid. At
the same time, the ON-players probability of getting a ride increases because there is no
competition from the OFF-player at the moment. With D ≥ 1, a lone ON-player will always
secure a ride. The OFF-player has to pick a ride from the left-over demand D − 1 ≤ D/2,
reducing their chance to serve a customer. Consequently, the expected payoff is
Π1(ON|OFF) = pmid
Π2(OFF|ON) = (D − 1) pmid . (S13)
If both players play OFF, they secure an even higher price phigh > pmid as the dynamic
pricing algorithm reacts to the apparent supply S − 2 = 0. In this case, both players again
have equal chance to secure a ride and achieve the expected payoff
Π1(OFF|OFF) = D
2
phigh
Π2(OFF|OFF) = D
2
phigh . (S14)
The Nash equilibria of the two-player game depend on the parameter values ofD, plow, pmid
and phigh. In particular, we distinguish two extreme cases:
• D = 1: In the low demand limit D = 1, the game is either a stag hunt or a prisoner’s
dilemma.
ON OFF
ON
(
1
2plow,
1
2plow
)
(pmid, 0)
OFF (0, pmid)
(
1
2phigh,
1
2phigh
)
– Stag Hunt : For pmid <
phigh
2
, the payoff matrix reduces to that of a stag hunt [38]
with 0 < 1
2
plow < pmid <
phigh
2
, where OFF is a payoff dominant, and ON a risk
dominant Nash equilibrium.
– Prisoner’s Dilemma: For pmid >
phigh
2
, the payoff structure changes to that of a
prisoner’s dilemma [21], 0 < 1
2
plow <
phigh
2
< pmid, where ON is the unique Nash
equilibrium.
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• D = 2: In the high demand limit D = 2, the payoff matrix is a trivial, fully symmetric
game
ON OFF
ON (plow, plow) (pmid, pmid)
OFF (pmid, pmid) (phigh, phigh)
where OFF is the strictly dominant Nash equilibrium. Drivers always have an incentive
to coordinate to cause a price surge in lack of competition for rides.
Hence, the dynamic price response and the demand to supply ratio govern the drivers’
incentives under which constellations to switch OFF their mobile applications or when to
remain ON.
55
Two-player game with elastic demand
Based on the simplified game modelling the fundamental incentives for drivers in ride-
hailing systems described in the previous section, we now consider in more detail under which
conditions drivers induce artificial price surges. In particular, we relax the assumption of
inelastic demand D, such that only some customers D′ ≤ D actually book a ride.
For the following analysis, we assume a linear increase of the surge fee as the supply
decreases such that the total fare p′ is given by
p′(S < D) = pbase + pmaxsurge
D − S
D
. (S15)
The price increases beyond the constant base cost pbase as soon as the supply S falls below
the total demand D (all potential customers checking the app for the cost of a ride). Without
loss of generality, we assume pbase = 1 in all following calculations for the two-player game.
The dependence of the total fare on the supply is illustrated in Fig. S20a.
Rather than paying high surge fees, however, customers may choose to wait until the
price for their trip decreases or they may choose alternative modes of transportation such
as (fixed price) taxi cabs or public transport to accommodate their demand. We model
this price elasticity of the demand by assuming a willingness of customers to pay for a ride
uniformly distributed in the interval [pbase, pmax]. As the price increases, the number of
customers D′ actually booking a ride thus decreases linearly as
D′(p′) = D0
(
1− p
′ − pbase
pmax − pbase
)
= D0
(
1− p
′ − pbase
pmax − pbase
)
= D0(1− δ(p′ − pbase)) (S16)
where δ = (pmax − pbase)−1 describes the price elasticity of demand. Here, we assume that
the base costs are set at the maximum possible value where all customers book a ride if
there is no surge (Fig. S20b). Additionally, we assume that phigh = pbase + p
max
surge ≤ pmax
such that there are some customers willing to pay the highest possible surge fee. Otherwise,
the surge fee is chosen unreasonably high as it might completely nullify the demand, even if
some supply of drivers is still available.
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FIG. S20. Price structure and demand response in the two-player game. a, The total fare
payed by the customers and earned by the drivers is the base cost pbase and an additional surge
fee. When the supply decreases below the demand D, the price increases linearly to a maximum
value phigh = pbase + p
max
surge [compare Eq. (S15)]. b, The demand D
′ of customers actually ordering
a ride decreases as soon as the price increases above pbase. It decreases to D
′ = 0 when the price
reaches pmax [compare Eq. (S16)]. We assume phigh ≤ pmax as otherwise the demand would vanish
while there are still drivers available, indicating an unreasonably large value of pmaxsurge.
In summary, for a total supply of Stot = 2 players, we have S ∈ {0, 1, 2} depending on the
drivers choice of strategy with corresponding values p′ ∈ {plow, pmid, phigh} for the total fare
and D′ ∈ {Dlow, Dmid, Dhigh} for the demand (Fig. S20). The payoff matrix is then given by
ON OFF
ON ( Dlow2 plow ,
Dlow
2 plow ) ( pmid , (Dmid − 1) pmid )
OFF ( (Dmid − 1) pmid , pmid ) ( Dhigh2 phigh ,
Dhigh
2 phigh )
with the total fare and demand depending on the drivers’ decisions
• (ON, ON) with supply S = 2
plow = pbase
Dlow = D
• (ON, OFF) or (OFF, ON) with supply S = 1
pmid = pbase + p
max
surge
D − 1
D
Dmid = D
(
1− δ pmaxsurge
D − 1
D
)
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• (OFF, OFF) with supply S = 0
phigh = pbase + p
max
surge
Dhigh = D
(
1− δ pmaxsurge
)
where, for simplicity of presentation, we do not explicitly note the case distinctions to
ensure that each driver serves at most one and at least zero customers and the total fare
only increases if S < D. The equations as presented are valid for 1 ≤ D ≤ 2 and δ pmaxsurge < 1.
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Figure S21 shows the resulting Nash equilibria for this two-player game with elastic de-
mand for different demand D, maximum surge fee pmaxsurge and demand elasticities δ (compare
Fig. 2b in the manuscript).
• δ = 0: In the limit of inelastic demand we reproduce the findings discussed above.
For demand D ≤ 2 and pmid > phigh/2 strong competition between players results in
a Nash equilibrium in ON-strategies (green in Fig. S21a). For sufficiently high surge
fees the game changes to a stag hunt (pmid > phigh/2) where both ON, OFF and mixed
strategy Nash equilibria coexists (striped area in Fig. S21a). For sufficiently high
demand (guaranteed for D ≥ 2), drivers are strongly incentivized to switch OFF their
apps (orange in Fig. S21a).
• δ = 0.15: The drivers’ incentive structure starts to shift when introducing demand
elasticitiy (see Fig. S21b). Inducing artificial price surges becomes unrealiable as the
increase of the total fare (profit per ride) may be compensated by the reduced number
of customers and drivers switching OFF their app have a higher risk missing out on
potential customers. At low demand, larger δ intensifies the competition between
drivers and forces them to stay ONline. The regime where remaining ONline is the
Nash equilibrium extends to much higher surge fees than for inelastic demand since.
However, in the low demand limit D < 1 the coexistence of ON and OFF Nash
equilibria persists for large possible surge fees as the risk becomes independent of the
surge fee when there is less than one customer D < 1. Importantly, the regime where
OFF is the pure strategy Nash equilibrium shrinks compared to the situation for δ = 0.
• δ = 0.3: For strongly elastic demand drivers are interacting in a highly competitive
environment. For almost all D < 2 and very large surge fees, the Nash equilibrium
is in ON-strategies as strong demand response which lead to expected profit loss for
drivers that go OFFline (green in Fig. S21c). The coexistence regime of ON and OFF
Nash equilibria for low demand disappears for high elasticity δ = 0.3. Only for low
values pmaxsurge < 1.5 and sufficiently strong demand D ≥ 2, playing OFFline strategies
remains a Nash equilibrium (orange in Fig. S21c). In the intermediate regime, the
incentive structure forces drivers into a mixed strategy equilibrium (blue-red striped
in Fig. S21c).
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Hence, there exist four well pronounced regimes of Nash equilibria in ride-hailing games.
While strong competition compels drivers to always remain ONline in the limit of low overall
demand, the reverse applies to situations with high demand where going OFFline is the
dominant strategy. Demand elasticities and the maximum possible surge fee modulate this
picture. These results illustrate the basic incentives for drivers: high, inelastic demand and
sufficient additional profit due to surge fees promotes drivers to exploit their control over the
market and induce artificial price surges. High price elasticity (e.g. due to other competitive
public transport options) increases competition and reduces these incentives.
a Price elasticity
Demand D
b Price elasticity
Demand D
c Price elasticity
Demand D
(ON, ON)
(OFF, OFF)
(OFF, ON)
(ON, OFF)
Mixed
strategy
FIG. S21. Low price elasticity and high demand promote artificial supply shortages.
a, Nash equlibria of the two-player game (see text) with completely inelastic demand, δ = 0. As
discussed above, at D = 1 the game transitions from a Prisoner’s Dilemma at low pmaxsurge < 1 with a
single Nash equlibrium to a Stag Hunt with multiple Nash equilibria. For sufficiently high demand
D ≥ 2, the game becomes trivial with a single (OFF, OFF) socialy optimal Nash equlibrium. b,
Nash equlibria of the two-player game (see text) with completely elastic demand δ = 0.15. c, Nash
equlibria of the two-player game (see text) with completely elastic demand with higher elasticity
δ = 0.30. As the demand elasticity increases, ON becomes the only Nash equlibrium in a large
part of the parameter space. Only for very high demand OFF remains a feasible strategy. Overall,
these results illustrate that high demand and low price elasticity of demand incentivize drivers to
create artificial supply shortages.
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Multiplayer game with elastic demand
In a more realistic setting, a larger number N > 2 of drivers interact, making a decision
to switch their ride-hailing application ON or OFF. In this section, we consider a version of
the game described above with N > 2 players.
For simplicity, we consider only the case of high demand, where the total demand D is
equal to the total supply N drivers. When drivers switch OFF their ride-hailing application,
the dynamic pricing algorithm reacts to the apparent supply S and increases the price, as
in the two-player game. We assume the same cost function Eq. (S15), that simplifies to
p′(ρOFF) = pbase + pmaxsurge ρOFF (S17)
under the assumption of high demand, D = N . ρOFF =
N−S
N
is the fraction of drivers
playing OFF and pmaxsurge is the maximal supply-driven surge fee when no drivers are available
(e.g. when all drivers collectively switch to the OFF state). This dynamic pricing function
implies that an individual driver turning his or her app OFF, ρOFF = 1/N , changes the price
by pmaxsurge/N .
As before, customers react to the new price p′. With the above assumption, equation (S16)
simplifies to
D′(p′) = D0
(
1− p
′ − pbase
pmax − pbase
)
= D0
(
1− δ pmaxsurge ρOFF
)
(S18)
where δ = (pmax − pbase)−1 again describes the price elasticity of the demand.
Selfish action: We first consider this game in the case where all drivers act selfishly
and try to maximize their own payoff. Since we assume a total demand D = N and
pmax ≥ pbase +pmaxsurge, a driver choosing to remain ONline will always be able to secure a ride.
Their expected payoff is then
Π[ON|ρOFF] = p′ = pbase + pmaxsurge ρOFF. (S19)
ON divers thus profit from the decision of other drivers to go OFFline. On the other hand,
a driver playing the OFF strategy receives
Π[OFF|ρOFF] = D
′ −N (1− ρOFF)
NρOFF
p′ = (1− δ pmaxsurge)
(
pbase + p
max
surge ρOFF
)
, (S20)
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where the first term corresponds to the probability of an OFF-driver to get one of the
remaining D′ − N(1 − ρOFF) customers after ON drivers have already secured their rides
(illustrated in Fig. S22a).
Clearly, playing ON is always more beneficial for the individual player (see also Fig. S22b).
Still, a driver may choose to play OFF if the expected payoff is larger than the payoff
Π[ON|ρOFF = 0] = pbase in the case where everyone remains ONline, that means when
(1 − δ pmaxsurge)
(
pbase + p
max
surge ρOFF
) ≥ pbase. For large N , ρOFF = 1/N is small for a single
driver. Therefore, the inequality is only true (selfish action beneficial) if N is sufficiently
small, N ≤ N∗ = 1−δpmaxsurge
δpbase
.
Collective action: In contrast to selfish action, drivers may choose to cooperate to drive
up the price and potentially increase their collective payoff p′D′ even if this is not beneficial
for an individual driver (see Fig. S22a). The expected collective payoff per driver is (see
Fig. S22b)
Πcoll[ρOFF]
N
=
p′D′
N
=
(
pbase + p
max
surge ρOFF
)
D0
(
1− δ pmaxsurge ρOFF
)
N
= pbase + p
max
surge ρOFF
(
1− δ pbase − δ pmaxsurge ρOFF
)
. (S21)
In the limit ρOFF → 0, this reduces to the average payoff Πcoll[ρOFF=0]N = D0 pbaseN = pbase
when everyone remains ONline. Maximizing this collective payoff gives the socially optimal
fraction of OFF players
ρ∗OFF =
1− pbase δ
2 δ pmaxsurge
, (S22)
assuming 0 < ρ∗OFF < 1, otherwise ρ
∗
OFF takes the limiting value 0 or 1. In this socially
optimal configuration, drivers only serve a fraction 1− 1−pbaseδ
2
of potential customers (illus-
trated in Fig. S22) while all other customers choose a different mode of transport or wait
for the price to drop.
Overall, cooperation between drivers allows them to achieve a higher collective payoff.
In a repeated game, different drivers may rotate playing OFF for the benefit of the group,
resulting in a game of cooperation (coordinated OFF) and defection (always ON) among
the drivers. Note that the collective payoff depends only on the product pmaxsurge ρOFF. The
qualitative behavior is thus independent of pmaxsurge and a general consequence of the dynamic
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pricing mechanism in this simplified model. If pmaxsurge is changed, the fraction of offline
drivers ρOFF will change to compensate (as far as possible) and the overall price p
′, payoff
and fraction of riders served remains unchanged. As for the two-player game, lower demand
D0 < N or higher price elasticity of the demand increases the payoff gap between ON and
OFF players, increasing the incentive to defect and making it more difficult to organize
cooperation.
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FIG. S22. Price elasticity of demand and optimal payoff with collective action. a The
demand decreases as the price increases with price elasticity δ [top panel, compare Eq. (S18)]. The
increase in price is linearly related to the fraction ρOFF of OFF drivers [Eq. (S17)] such that the
demand also decreases linearly with ρOFF (bottom panel). For pmax > pbase + p
max
surge, the demand
decreases such that every ON driver always gets a customer (bottom panel, shaded blue) and
OFF drivers have to compete for the left-over customers (shaded red). b The average payoff per
driver has a maximum at an intermediate price (top panel). This price corresponds to the optimal
fraction ρ∗OFF of OFF drivers Eq. (S22). As a group, all drivers achieve a maximal collective
(socially optimal) payoff. However, for each driver individually, ON is the better strategy (bottom
panel).
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Dynamic multiplayer game under elastic demand
Based on the previous two games, we now consider a repeated dynamic game, where
drivers interact with the demand not only once. Instead they do so in a time-continuous
system, making decisions whether to switch their app ON or OFF all the time and being
busy for some time when they serve a customer.
We consider a system where N drivers serve customers that arrive following a stochastic
process. For simplicity, we model the arrivals of customers as a Poisson process with a
constant rate λ. In particular, we assume a uniform request rate over time (a valid approxi-
mation during most of the day as suggested by our demand analysis in section ) and do not
model, for example, the discrete arrivals of individual planes. This describes the limiting
case where the time passengers need to cross the airport, claim baggage etc. is sufficiently
heterogeneous to smooth out the discrete arrival events.
When a customer arrives, they check the current price of transportation and, depending
on their willingness to pay, either book a ride, wait for some time or leave the system (e.g.
choosing a different mode of transportation or a different ride-hailing service provider). As
above, the maximum price a customer is willing to pay is distributed uniformly in the interval
[pbase, pmax]. When the customer requests a ride, the oldest (longest waiting) ONline driver
at the airport is selected to serve the ride. Here, we include the time the driver may have
spent OFFline in this waiting time. The driver then serves the customer and returns to the
airport after a round-trip time ts uniformly distributed in [2td −∆, 2td + ∆].
Drivers waiting idly at the airport may decide to switch OFF their app to induce a surge.
We calculate the current price p′(t) at time t based on the current number Nidle(t) of ONline
drivers at the airport similar to the prevoulsy discussed games as
p′(t) =
pbase | Nidle(t) ≥ Nthreshpbase + pmaxsurge (1− Nidle(t)Nthres ) | Nidle(t) < Nthresh . (S23)
Since there is not absolute demand in this case, we encode the demand in the number of
drivers Nthresh below which the surge fee begins. We take Nthresh = λ (2td) as the number of
drivers required to serve all λ (2td) expected incoming requests before one of these drivers
returns to the airport.
Note that we assume instantaneous updates of the price as a function of the current state
of the system. There is no delay or dependence on the history of the system. As such,
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individual drivers can never profit themselves from the surge they induce (in contrast to
the static games). When they go ONline, the price immediately decreases. Instead, other
drivers may get higher payoffs and the drivers may profit as a group (as in the multiplayer
game).
In the following we describe the parameters used in the model, give a mean-field cal-
culation of the socially optimal strategy and describe the detailed dynamics of the time-
continuous simulation here and in the main manuscript. Finally, we illustrate the robustness
of the induced price surges across a range of model parameters.
Parameters
Parameters used to illustrate the dynamic model here and in the main manuscript are
loosely based on the observed price estimates from Washington D.C. (DCA). For the base
cost and possible surge fee, we take pbase = 16 and p
max
surge = 20. We take pmax = 54 as the
maximum observed total fare for an Uber Black ride.
Other parameters were chosen to (i) be in line with realistic values and (ii) be in the
correct range to exhibit price surges in the simulations. In particular, we choose the round-
trip time 〈ts〉 = 2td = 30 min, corresponding to the expected time of taxi rides from the
airport of approximately 15 min, distributed in the interval [2td −∆, 2td + ∆] with ∆ = 5
minutes. We choose the request rate λ = 2 min−1, approximately in line with the average
number of taxi trips recorded at DCA. Together with the number of drivers N = 160, these
parameters corresponds to drivers spending 50 min between each of their 30 min rides waiting
at the airport and to an average number of 100 drivers waiting at the airport at any given
time.
With the above parameters we require at least Nthresh = λ (2td) = 60 drivers at the origin
to avoid surge fees. When all drivers are always ONline, we have on average 100 drivers
idle at the airport. In this setting, we thus expect a constant price pbase with only very rare
fluctuations.
All simulations start with all drivers ONline and currently waiting for a request.
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Mean field
In order to determine the optimal strategy for the drivers, we first consider a mean field
description of the system described above. For this calculation, we are only interested in the
average steady state values of the price p′, the request rate λ′ and the number of ONline,
OFFline and idle drivers NON , NOFF and Nidle.
On the demand side, of all potential customers only a fraction pmax−p
′
pmax−pbase will actually
request transport after checking the price. This effectively reduces the request rate to
λ′ =
pmax − p′
pmax − pbaseλ . (S24)
Note that, as before, we assume that the demand relevant for calculating the surge fee does
not change, i.e. there is no demand dependence in the price function Eq. (S23). The total
rate λ of customers checking the price (though not necessarily requesting a ride) and Nthres
remain constant.
On the supply side, we are interested in the number Nidle of idle drivers at the airport
to calculate the total fare. As in the static game, we assume a constant fraction ρOFF of
drivers to be OFFline. On average, the remaining NON = N −NOFF = N (1− ρOFF) drivers
spend 〈ts〉 = 2td driving and 〈tw〉 = Nidle/λ′ waiting at the airport for their next customer.
Weighting the distribution of drivers with these times gives the number of drivers waiting
idly as the airport as the fraction
Nidle =
〈tw〉
〈ts〉+ 〈tw〉 NON
which results in
Nidle = NON − λ′ (2 td)
= NON − 2λ td pmax − p
′
pmax − pbase (S25)
Together with the dynamic price function Eq. (S23), we now have a self-consitency con-
dition for relating the price p′ and the number of idle drivers Nidle [Eq. (S23) and (S25)].
The solution of this self-consisstency condition gives the equilibrium total fare p′ and the
optimal number of ONline drivers NON. Due to the number of case distinctions arising from
to the piece-wise definition of the price and to ensure, for example, 0 ≤ Nidle ≤ NON for all
possible parameter choices, we do not give the full solution here. Instead, the solution is
illustrated in Fig. S23.
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FIG. S23. Self-consistency condition for the price and the number of idle drivers. The
plots show the functions p′(Nidle) [Eq. (S23), light blue] and Nidle(p′) [Eq. (S25), dark blue] when
a all drivers are ONline, b Nmin = 40 drivers are OFFline at the boundary to price surges and c in
the mean-field optimal case when N∗OFF = 91 drivers are OFFline. The price increases only when
sufficiently many drivers NOFF > Nmin go OFFline.
With the price and the average request rate in equilibrium, the average earning rate of a
single ONline driver follows as the profit from a ride divided by the total time for one ride
(round-trip time and waiting for the next ride) as
ΠON =
p′
〈ts〉+ 〈tw〉 =
p′λ′
2td λ′ +Nidle
(S26)
and the collective earning rate as the weighted average with the OFFline drivers, who earning
nothing,
Πcoll = (1− ρOFF) ΠON = p
′λ′ (1− ρOFF)
2td λ′ +Nidle
. (S27)
For the parameters described above (〈2 td〉 = 30 min, N = 160), we obtain the follow-
ing results: If all drivers are always ONline, they earn an average of 12 USD per hour or
p = pbase = 16 USD per ride with 30 + 50 minutes between rides. The drivers can earn more
if they reduce the number of idle ONline drivers to at most Nthresh = 60 drivers by switching
OFF their app. They maximize their profit when only N∗idle = 26 drivers are available at
the airport (N∗ON = 69), collectively earning 14.39 USD per hour. Here, the ON-drivers earn
p∗ = 27.14 USD per ride with 30 + 18.8 minutes between rides but approximately 57% of
all drivers are OFFline and earn nothing.
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Simulation
In our simulation of the system, we make a few additional assumptions for the strategy
of the drivers and the behavior of the customers. In particular, we assume that the drivers
use a strategy informed by the above mean field calculations: Drivers switch OFF their app
if there are enough drivers willing to participate in a surge to reduce the number of idle
drivers to at least Nthres. However, drivers switch OFF their app only while there are more
than N∗idle idle drivers at the airport (i.e. while the price is lower than their optimal price),
otherwise they wait to serve requests and collect the higher total fare.
While the drivers collectively earn the most with this optimal strategy, a single driver
who stays OFFline for the benefit of the group would earn very little or even nothing. To
ensure an equitable distribution of payoff across drivers, we assume that the drivers are
not perfectly social and are only willing to remain OFFline for a limited amount of time.
Drivers turn their app back ON after at most tmaxOFF = 20 min and only participate in one
surge per ride. This means, if a driver participated in a surge, they will not participate in
another surge until after they served a ride and received some payoff. This ensures that
each driver earns a similar amount over the course of the simulation. In addition, such a
behavior might more realistically reflect actions of drivers who cannot switch their app ON
and OFF constantly, for example to avoid being detected by automated algorithms of the
service provider.
On the customer side, we assume that customers do not immediately leave the system
but instead wait for tcustwait = 10 min, checking the price every ∆t
cust = 2 min before finally
deciding to leave the system. Note that the maximum price they are willing to pay does not
change during this time.
We aggregate the earnings of all drivers over Tsim = 7 days of continuous requests (roughly
equivalent to a month real time with 6 hours of requests per day). For perfectly social drivers
that are willing to remain OFFline indefinitely (but still only participate in one surge per
ride) the simulation accurately reproduces the predicted outcome of the mean field calcula-
tions, illustrated in Fig. S24. The drivers keep the price constant and close to its optimal
value. They collectively earn 14.43 USD per hour on average (standard deviation across
drivers 1.12 USD per hour and minimal earning of an individual driver of 11.23 USD per
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hour) in the simulation, agreeing with the predicted 14.39 USD per hour from mean field
calculations. Due to the fluctuations in the demand and the total number of drivers at the
airport, the number of drivers required to be OFFline also fluctuates. This creates a suffi-
cient mixing of OFFline and ONline drivers over the course of the simulation to distribute
the payoff relatively equally.
For only partially social drivers, the dynamics changes (Fig. S25). Drivers switch OFF
their app but return ONline after tmaxoff = 20 minutes, ending the surge. After the surge,
there are not sufficiently many drivers willing to participate in another surge and the price
relaxes to its base value pbase as all drivers are ONline. Only after these drivers have served
a customer and returned to the airport, a new surge starts when sufficiently many drivers
are willing to participate again. These dynamics determine both the timescale for the du-
ration of the surges (explicitly as tmaxoff = 20) and the time between the surges (implicitly
via the driver turn-over rate depending on the request rate λ). The induced surge peaks
typically reach the driver-optimal price for a short time, resulting in a characteristic pattern
of repeated short price spikes with (almost) fixed amplitude. In reality, the dynamics would
be affected also by the timescale of the dynamic pricing algorithm reacting to the supply
and demand changes as well as by additional demand-side incentives such as fewer alterna-
tive transport options (resulting in lower price elasticity of customers or higher willingness
to pay) late at night and other external influences such as traffic conditions and variable
round-trip time (see Fig. S28 or Fig. 2c in the main manuscript). Overall, the drivers earn
13.64 USD per hour with this strategy (standard deviation 0.24 USD per hour and minimal
earning 12.98 USD per hour), corresponding to lower total earnings but also much lower
risk for extremely low income.
In contrast, when drivers remain always ONline, they only earn 12.07 USD per hour
on average (standard deviation 0.04 USD per hour), agreeing with the 12 USD per hour
expected from the mean field calculation (see above). Thus, drivers collectively increase
their profits compared to the baseline always-ON strategy but they do not achieve the
optimal payoff. However, in contrast to the case of perfectly social drivers who remain
OFFline indefinitely, they keep the distribution of income much more similar among all
drivers without the need to explicitly share the profits at the end of the game, reducing
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the risk for individual drivers to participate. Overall, the optimal strategy for the drivers
depends on their risk-aversion preferences and their trust in the other drivers to cooperate
(during the current day as well as across longer timescales).
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FIG. S24. Perfectly social drivers reproduce mean-field estimates. a Total number of
drivers at the airport (light blue) and number of idle ONline drivers (dark blue) at the airport.
b Number of OFFline drivers. Perfectly social drivers are willing to remain OFFline indefinitely,
resulting in the constant (mean-field optimal) number of ONline drivers NON = N
∗
ON = 26 in
panel a. c The resulting price is constant close to the mean-field optimal price. However, only
ONline drivers actually earn this payoff for rides.
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FIG. S25. Partially social drivers induce repeated price surges. a Total number of drivers
at the airport (light) and number of idle ONline drivers (dark) at the airport. b Number of
OFFline drivers. Partially social drivers remain OFFline for at most tmaxOFF = 20 minutes and only
participate in one surge per ride, resulting in repeated periods where a large number of drivers
are offline. c The resulting price reflects the anomalous supply dynamics. The drivers’ strategy
results in repeated price surges with a characteristic amplitude and duration when sufficiently
many drivers at the airport are willing to participate in a surge. As drivers rotate being OFFline,
all drivers profit equally from these price surges.
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Robustness: The qualitative results of the model are robust to changes of the parameters,
such as the price limits and thresholds. In particular, the qualitative picture of repeated surge
peaks occurs for a range of values of tmaxOFF. This parameter explicitly sets the timescale of
surges, describing how social or trusting the drivers are (see Fig. S26a-c). When tmaxOFF > 2td,
drivers are sufficiently social to bridge the time until another driver has serviced a customer
and is willing to join the surge again. This leads to a permanently high surge fee since
some drivers are OFFline at all times. As tmaxOFF increases, the dynamics become more and
more similar to the mean-field limit where drivers remain OFFline indefinitely (compare
Fig. S26d-f).
The second relevant timescale in the system is the driver turn over rate, influencing the
duration between individual surges. This turn over rate is directly related to the request
rate λ (demand). As the demand decreases, more drivers need to go OFFline to induce
a surge since fewer drivers are required to serve the predicted upcoming requests. That
means the parameter Nthres in the price function Eq. (S23) decreases while the total number
of drivers remains constant, N = 160. This makes surges more difficult to coordinate and
less frequent, as drivers participating in one surge need longer times to serve a ride and
become willing to induce a surge again. Resulting time series for different request rates are
illustrated in Fig. S27. The results reflect the qualitative intuition from the two previous
discussions: a lower demand makes it more difficult to organize surges as the incentive to
defect is higher and more trust is required between the players.
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FIG. S26. Repeated price surges transition into constant surge as drivers become more
social. a-c When drivers are only weakly social and want to ensure a high payoff for themselves,
they remain OFFline only for a short amount of time tmaxOFF ≤ 2td = 30 minutes. After a surge,
most drivers are not willing to participate in another one. Only when sufficiently many drivers
have served a ride they initiate the next surge. This leads to repeated short price spikes with
characteristic amplitude and duration set by tmaxOFF. d-f When drivers are more trusting and social
(sharing of profits, reciprocation over longer timescales) and tmaxOFF > 2td, drivers can bridge the
time until a driver returns from a ride. This creates a permanently high surge fee, similar to the
mean-field limit (compare Fig. S24).
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FIG. S27. Price surges are more common with higher demand. As the demand increases
(request rate λ increases from a to c), surges become more frequent. With the request rate, the
driver turn over rate increases. As a consequence, drivers are willing to participate in surges more
often and the time between surges decreases.
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Variable travel time In the main manuscript, we showed simulation results with variable
travel time (variable base cost) to more closely model the daily dynamics including rush
hour and periods of heavy traffic. For these simulations, we modulate the round-trip time
such that 〈ts〉 increases to 60 minutes during rush hour (doubling the standard travel time
from td = 15 to td = 30, approximately reflecting the average taxi trip duration during rush
hour from DCA) to more closely replicate the price dynamics observed at DCA. As the
round-trip time changes during the simulation, we adjust the driver strategy based on the
optimal mean-field strategy assuming static conditions with the current round-trip time.
We use the price function pbase = 1 USD + td
USD
minute
to determine the base cost (changing
from 16 USD to 31 USD) depending on the expected travel time. At the same time, the
threshold before surge pricing sets in also changes over time based on the current round-trip
time, calculated as described above as the number of drivers required to bridge the time
until the first driver returns, Nthresh = λ (2td).
Figure S28 shows the same results as Fig. 2c in the main manuscript with additional
detail on the supply and demand in the last panel. The supply (number of drivers at the
airport) was converted to units of trips per minute to be comparable to the demand by
comparing it to the number of requests that can be served before surge sets in,
supply = 1 +
number of drivers at airport
λ (2td)
= 1 +
number of drivers at airport
Nthresh
, (S28)
effectively assuming λ (2td) drivers are currently busy. This means surge pricing sets in as
soon as the supply is lower than the expected demand λ = 2 requests per minute. The
expected equilibrium supply follows as
equilibrium supply =
total number of drivers
λ (2td)
=
total number of drivers
Nthresh
, (S29)
Due to the stochasticity of the demand (shown as a 60 minute moving average to avaerage the
comparatively low number of requests), the number of requests per minute is not constant
but fluctuates around the expected value. Correspondingly, the available supply varies
stochastically around the mean field equilibrium supply. Note that the sotchastic fluctuations
of the demand or supply are not correlated with the induced price surges.
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FIG. S28. Simulation with variable travel time qualitatively reproduces surge dynam-
ics observed at DCA. The figure shows the total fare, base cost and surge fee of the simulation
replicating typical rush hour dynamics with variable travel time during morning and evening com-
muting hours (compare Fig. 2c in the main manuscript). The last panel shows additional details on
the supply and demand evolution. The supply (grey, number of drivers at the airport) fluctuates
corresponding to the stochastic demand (60 minute moving average, solid red line). The actual
supply of online drivers (solid purple line) shows repeated supply shortages creating price surges.
The dashed lines indicate the average request rate (demand, red) and the mean field equilibrium
number of drivers expected at the airport at the given conditions and full demand (ignoring reduced
demand due to increased price).
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Summary
The actual mechanism used by Uber to assign ride requests to drivers at airports is
unknown. In particular not all drivers that take a trip from the airport will immediately
return and not all drivers will have to wait a long time and be able or willing to coordinate.
For example, a driver arriving at the airport terminal to drop off a passenger may be preferred
to immediately pick up a customer due to lower waiting time since this driver is already
at the terminal compared to drivers waiting in a parking lot further away. The exact
dynamics depend also on the layout of the airport and local regulations (where drivers may
park, how long customers take to exit the airport and book a ride etc.). Moreover, while
we showed in the main manuscript and in section of this document that the demand is
approximately constant over the day and the price surges are not significantly correlated
with the arrivals, fluctuations due to clustered arrivals of airplanes likely still enter in the
pricing algorithm. Importantly, clustered arrivals and temporarily increased demand also
change the incentive structure, as the artificially induced price surges become easier to
organize and more profitable at higher demand as illustrated in all above models. Moreover,
dynamic pricing algorithms typically do not react instantaneously to changes. A longer
reaction timescale may allow drivers to profit from their own induced surge (as assumed in
the discussion of the two-player and multiplayer static model). This may also contribute to
easier organization of artificial price surges.
Overall, while the above models do not exactly replicate reality, they qualitatively illus-
trate the incentives inherent in dynamic pricing mechanisms for drivers to maximize their
profit by collectively inducing price surges. In particular, they illustrate that these incentives
exist even with the most basic form of dynamic pricing over a range of models, showing that
artificial supply shortages are a general problem across dynamic pricing schemes. Specifi-
cally, the models illustrate the following:
• The two-player model illustrates that the basic incentive exists in the simplest possible
setting independent of the parameters of the pricing algorithm and provides a simple
model to understand the conditions that promote anomalous supply dynamics.
• The multiplayer game extends this setting and illustrates that the effect remains when
drivers act in a socially optimal way. This one-time game would describe the dynamics
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when the demand is strongly localized in time, for example for simultaneous requests
from many passengers arriving on the same plane.
• The dynamic model serves to illustrate that repeated price surges may emerge in a
simple model, even without explicit planning. In particular, it illustrates that these
price surges emerge for a broad range of parameters and that the incentives illustrated
in the static, one-off games are sufficient to induce repeated price surges.
We note that the same arguments made here for supply-induced price surges in principle
also hold for demand-induced surge fee manipulation, for example by temporarily reducing
demand to lower the price. Naturally, organizing such collective action on the demand side
is much harder (as all players are strangers) and the game is typically not repeated with
the same group of people (more incentive to defect). Additionally, service providers have
little incentive to reduce prices as the price for ride-hailing services is typically already low
(due to competition with other service providers, taxi cabs and public transport), leaving
not much room for price decreases. Thus, while the mechanism in principle translates
to demand-induced down-surges, the conditions make these much harder to execute than
supply-induced up-surges.
79
DATA – METHODOLOGY AND DETAILS
Dynamic pricing mechanisms are increasingly adopted in on-demand mobility services.
In ride-hailing, Uber Technologies Inc. operates one of the largest digital marketplaces where
more than 90 million monthly active users from all around the world request rides and are
matched with a driver subject to a dynamically adapted price [39]. In the main manuscript,
we illustrated how specific market conditions incentivize collective action among drivers
that induce non-stationary price dynamics. We based our findings on Uber price estimate
time series collected for trip in different locations all around the globe. We compared
the price data against time series of aircraft deplanements collected for Reagan National
Airport (DCA) as well as historic taxi trip records in Washington D.C. In this section of the
Supplementary Material, we provide detailed information on all sources of data, our data
acquisition approach, data content and quality as well as how we analyzed the raw data to
obtain our main findings.
Data sources and acquisition
In this subsection, we detail the different data sources used to acquire the data required
to conduct our analyses.
Acquisition of Uber price time series
Uber price estimates. Uber’s price estimate API endpoint provides, amongst others,
price estimates for the company’s different ride-hailing services on a per trip basis. For
a given trip characterized by origin-destination coordinates (o, d), the interface returns a
current price estimate vector, whose entries i = {1, 2, . . . } contain a lower and upper bound
pimin and p
i
max per Uber product i operated in the area, a trip duration estimate td, as well
as a trip distance estimate l. Note that trip duration and distance estimates are universal
for the different Uber products. We attach a time stamp t per tuple ((o, d),pmin,pmax, l, td)t
and define the ride-hailing price dynamics as the time series {((o, d),pmin, l, td)t, t ∈ T}
where T is the set of all measurement times. In our price estimate time series analysis, we
use the lower bound on the price estimate pmin as the reference quantity for our calculations.
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Uber products. We focus on Uber’s standard ride-hailing services. Depending on local
availability, we use one the two economy products UberX or UberGO (India). For compari-
son we also consider one of the six premium products Black, Berline, Exec, Lux, Premier or
Select depending on the availability at the location.
Uber’s products API endpoint provides, amongst others, information on fee structure pa-
rameters for each of these products. We extract the information on booking fees, price per
minute, price per mile, distance unit, minimum fees and the currency code (see first section
of this document for details on Uber’s price model and Tab. S1 for an example of the data)
for the standard and premium Uber service operating in the respective area. Together with
the price estimate time series we use these parameters to compute the base cost and isolate
the surge dynamics not explained by distance and duration of the ride (compare Figs. S6-S7).
City and trip characteristics. We compare the price dynamics for Uber standard and
premium rides originating from different points of interests in metropolitan areas around
the globe. For four types of trip categories we record and analyze Uber price estimate time
series. These categories are:
• Airport : trip originates from an airport and ends at a point of interest in the nearby
city center (e.g. train station, business district, convention center)
• Station: trip originates from a major train station and ends at a point of interest in
the corresponding city (e.g. other train station, business district, convention center)
• Convention: trip originates from a local convention center and ends at a point of
interest in the corresponding city (e.g. train station, business district)
• City : trip originates and ends within the boundaries of a specific city, not specifying
a distinct point of interest (e.g. residential area, business district)
Note that the choice of trip origin and the local demand and supply situation (at the origin)
are the primary determinants for Uber’s dynamic pricing mechanism, while the precise choice
of destination within a city does not significantly affect the results. Hence, the chosen trip
categories classify the ride-hailing price dynamics at points of interest around the globe
where demand for rides is typically highly localized and expected to change periodically
during a day.
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Tab. S2 shows a full list of all 137 trips that Uber price estimate time series have been
recorded for, defined in terms of city, region, as well as specifics on origin-destination at-
tributes. It contains 63 airport (see Fig. S5), 12 station, 23 convention and 39 city trip
items. Per item, we provide detailed information on origin-destination coordinates, API
request rates, time intervals of data recording, standard and premium Uber products used
for the analysis, as well as aggregated measures of the surge dynamics in the spreadsheet
DataRideHailingPrices.xlsx available in the data section of the online Supplementary
Material.
We selected the trip sample based on three criteria (in order of priority):
• Uber activity : Uber operates in the local area.
• Global representation: Balanced mix of regions across the globe.
• Mixed points of interests : Balanced mix of airport, station, convention and city trips
to investigate effects of the qualitatively different demand structure expected at these
locations.
TABLE S2: Uber price estimates have been recorded
for airport, station, city and convention trips around
the world. The table provides the location (city and re-
gion) as well as trip classification characteristics (origin and
destination types). Labels are included for reference to the
figures in the first two sections of this document. Further trip
details can be found in the spreadsheet DataRideHailing-
Prices.xlsx available in the online Supplementary Material.
Label City Region Origin type Destination
type
ARN Stockholm Europe Airport Station
ATL Atlanta North America Airport City
BMA Stockholm Europe Airport Station
BOG Bogota South America Airport City
BOM Mumbai Asia Airport Station
Continued on next page. . .
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TABLE S2 – continued from previous page
Label City Region Origin type Destination
type
BRU Brussels Europe Airport Station
BWI Baltimore North America Airport Station
BWI Residential Area Trip Baltimore North America Airport City
BWI Urban Area Trip Baltimore North America Airport City
CAI Cairo Africa Airport Station
CDG Paris Europe Airport Station
CPT Cape Town Africa Airport City
DCA Washington
D.C.
North America Airport Station
DCA Residential Area Trip Washington
D.C.
North America Airport City
DCA Urban Area Trip Washington
D.C.
North America Airport City
DEL Dheli Asia Airport Station
EWR New York City North America Airport Station
EWR Residential Area Trip New York City North America Airport City
EWR Urban Area Trip New York City North America Airport City
EZE Buenos Aires South America Airport City
GIG Rio de Janeiro South America Airport Station
GLA Glasgow Europe Airport Station
GVA Geneva Europe Airport Station
HEL Helsinki Europe Airport Station
HKG Hong Kong Asia Airport Station
IAD Residential Area Trip Washington
D.C.
North America Airport City
IAD Urban Area Trip Washington
D.C.
North America Airport City
Continued on next page. . .
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TABLE S2 – continued from previous page
Label City Region Origin type Destination
type
IAH Houston North America Airport City
ICN Seoul Asia Airport Station
JFK New York City North America Airport Station
JFK Residential Area Trip New York City North America Airport City
JFK Urban Area Trip New York City North America Airport City
JNB Johannesburg Africa Airport City
LAX Los Angeles North America Airport Station
LGA New York City North America Airport Station
LGA Residential Area Trip New York City North America Airport City
LGA Urban Area Trip New York City North America Airport City
LHR London Europe Airport City
LIS Lisbon Europe Airport Station
MAA Chennai Asia Airport City
MAN Manchester Europe Airport Station
MEL Melbourne Oceania Airport City
MIA Miami North America Airport Station
MRS Marseille Europe Airport Station
MSY New Orleans North America Airport Station
MUC Munich Europe Airport Station
OAK Residential Area Trip Oakland North America Airport City
OAK Urban Area Trip Oakland North America Airport City
ORD Chicago North America Airport Station
OTP Bucharest Europe Airport Station
PER Perth Oceania Airport City
PHL Philadelphia North America Airport City
SEA Seattle North America Airport Station
SFO San Francisco North America Airport Station
Continued on next page. . .
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TABLE S2 – continued from previous page
Label City Region Origin type Destination
type
SFO Residential Area Trip San Francisco North America Airport City
SFO Urban Area Trip San Francisco North America Airport City
SJC Residential Area Trip San Francisco North America Airport City
SJC Urban Area Trip San Francisco North America Airport City
TLL Tallinn Europe Airport Station
VNO Vilnius Europe Airport Station
WAW Warsaw Europe Airport Station
YUL Montreal North America Airport Station
YYZ Toronto North America Airport Station
Hoboken Hoboken North America City City
Meatpacking District (NYC) New York City North America City City
New York City Trip 1 New York City North America City City
New York City Trip 2 New York City North America City City
New York City Trip 3 New York City North America City City
New York City Trip 4 New York City North America City City
New York City Trip 5 New York City North America City City
New York City Trip 6 New York City North America City City
New York City Trip 7 New York City North America City City
New York City Trip 8 New York City North America City City
New York City Trip 9 New York City North America City City
New York City Trip 10 New York City North America City City
New York City Trip 11 New York City North America City City
New York City Trip 12 New York City North America City City
New York City Trip 13 New York City North America City City
New York City Trip 14 New York City North America City City
New York City Trip 15 New York City North America City City
New York City Trip 16 New York City North America City City
Continued on next page. . .
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TABLE S2 – continued from previous page
Label City Region Origin type Destination
type
New York City Trip 17 New York City North America City City
New York City Trip 18 New York City North America City City
New York City Trip 19 New York City North America City City
San Francisco City Trip 1 San Francisco North America City City
San Francisco City Trip 2 San Francisco North America City City
San Francisco City Trip 3 San Francisco North America City City
San Francisco City Trip 4 San Francisco North America City City
San Francisco City Trip 5 San Francisco North America City City
San Francisco City Trip 6 San Francisco North America City City
San Francisco City Trip 7 San Francisco North America City City
San Francisco City Trip 8 San Francisco North America City City
San Francisco City Trip 9 San Francisco North America City City
Trump Tower (NYC) New York City North America City City
Washington, D.C. City Trip 1 Washington
D.C.
North America City City
Washington, D.C. City Trip 2 Washington
D.C.
North America City City
Washington, D.C. City Trip 3 Washington
D.C.
North America City City
Washington, D.C. City Trip 4 Washington
D.C.
North America City City
Washington, D.C. City Trip 6 Washington
D.C.
North America City City
Washington, D.C. City Trip 7 Washington
D.C.
North America City City
Washington, D.C. City Trip 8 Washington
D.C.
North America City City
Continued on next page. . .
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TABLE S2 – continued from previous page
Label City Region Origin type Destination
type
Washington, D.C. City Trip 9 Washington
D.C.
North America City City
Americas Center Convention
Complex
St. Louis North America Convention Airport
Austin Convention Center Austin North America Convention Airport
Boston Hynes Convention
Center
Boston North America Convention Airport
Colorado Convention Center Denver North America Convention Airport
Georgia World Congress
Center
Atlanta North America Convention Airport
Henry B. Gonzalez Conven-
tion Center
San Antonio North America Convention Airport
Houston Convention Center Houston North America Convention Airport
Hutchinson Convention
Center
Dallas North America Convention Airport
Jacob K. Javits Convention
Center
New York City North America Convention Airport
Los Angeles Convention
Center
Los Angeles North America Convention Airport
Minneapolis Convention
Center
Minneapolis North America Convention Airport
Moscone Center San Francisco North America Convention Airport
Nashville Music City Center Nashville North America Convention Airport
New Orleans Morial Center New Orleans North America Convention Airport
Orange County Convention
Center
Orange County North America Convention Station
Continued on next page. . .
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TABLE S2 – continued from previous page
Label City Region Origin type Destination
type
Pennsylvania Convention
Center
Philadelphia North America Convention Airport
Phoenix Convention Center Phoenix North America Convention Airport
Riverside Convention Center Riverside North America Convention Airport
San Diego Convention Center San Diego North America Convention Airport
Seattle Convention Center Seattle North America Convention Airport
Tampa Convention Center Tampa North America Convention Airport
Walter E. Washington Con-
vention Center
Washington
D.C.
North America Convention Airport
Washington, D.C. City Trip 5 Washington
D.C.
North America Convention City
30th Street Station
(Philadelphia)
Philadelphia North America Station Airport
Grand Central Station (NYC) New York City North America Station City
Jamaica Station (Queens) New York City North America Station Airport
Millenium Station (Chicago) Chicago North America Station Airport
Montreal Central Station Montreal North America Station Airport
Pennsylvania Station
(Newark)
Newark North America Station Airport
Pennsylvania Station (NYC) New York City North America Station City
Union Station (Chicago) Chicago North America Station Airport
Union Station (LA) Los Angeles North America Station Airport
Union Station (Toronto) Toronto North America Station City
Union Station (Washington,
D.C.)
Washington
D.C.
North America Station Airport
World Trade Center (NYC) New York City North America Station City
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Acquisition of aircraft deplanement time series
Flightradar24 is an online platform that provides real-time flight information on com-
mercial aircraft activity around the world. The service includes flight tracks, origins and
destinations, aircraft call signs and types, positions, altitudes, headings and speeds. We
use the platform’s open API to compile landing time statistics about deplanements at the
airports specified in Tab. S2.
Per deplanement at airport x, we create a landing event at time t provided as real landing
time treal and attach it with information on the aircraft’s official call sign s and its current
seat configuration cs. We retrieve the information on current aircraft seat configuration
via flightera.net, an online platform that provides detailed aircraft information per call sign.
The list of tuples (x, s, cs)treal recorded over the time span T defines the aircraft deplanement
time series that we use as a proxy to model the time-dependent demand for rides originating
from the airports.
Acquisition of taxi trip records
The Department of For-Hire Vehicles and the D.C. Office of the Chief Technology Officer
provide taxicab trip records for the Washington D.C. region. In our analysis, we focus on
the data recorded between 17/01/02 and 17/08/27, including 34 full weeks of data. From
this data set, we use a subset of approximately 370000 taxi trip records originating from
Reagan National Airport (DCA) to compile spatio-temporarily resolved trip statistics for
the average demand for taxi-like mobility services. We use taxi trips’ origin-destination
timestamps, their zip codes as well as longitudes and latitudes to determine a statistical
demand model per day of week.
Acquisition of foreign currency exchange rates
Ratesapi.io is a publicly accessible API that provides current and historical foreign ex-
change rates for different currencies based on the data made available through the European
Central Bank. We use the API to convert Uber price estimates in non-USD countries into
USD with the help of the exchange rate for the respective day.
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Acquisition of timezone information
We gathered the time zones for each airport using a JSON database from https://
github.com/mwgg, (accessed on 2019-07-12). For city, convention and station trips we en-
tered the time zone information manually. The conversion between the measured time in
CEST and the desired timezones was done using python’s pytz module, which takes care of
daylight saving times automatically.
Data content and quality
In this subsection, we detail the data quality per source and the data cleansing method-
ology applied to obtain the data serving as inputs for our analyses.
Uber price estimate time series
Uber price estimates provide possible fare ranges for the requested ride, upper and lower
bounded by the price vectors pmax and pmin. pmax and pmin are provided as integer values
in the local currency by the Uber API. Typically, the difference between pmax and pmin is
fixed for most of the time (e.g. 2 USD). For our analyses, we consider the lower bound of
the price estimate only.
Price estimates do not update continuously, but only approximately every two minutes
(compare Fig. S6). Hence, price estimate time series {((o, d),pmin, l, td)t, t ∈ T} contain
identical elements if sampling at higher frequency than two minute intervals. We provide
detailed information on the sampling frequency per recorded trip request in the spreadsheet
DataRideHailingPrices.xlsx available in the online Supplementary Material.
We do not clean the price estimate time series and use the raw data as inputs for our
analyses as described in more detail in the following subsection.
Aircraft deplanement time series
In rare occasions, flightradar24’s API does not return a real landing time, or information
on the airplane’s call sign. In those cases, we assume the flight to be cancelled and exclude
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the event from the time series that we use for our analyses.
Furthermore, in few cases there is no information on the current seat configuration avail-
able on flightera.net under the provided aircraft call sign. In those cases, we use the aircraft
model to estimate the number of seats from data containing call signs. First we match all
aircraft arrivals with known call signs with the number of seats obtained from flightera.net.
We then compute the average number of seats for every aircraft model. Arrivals without
a call sign entry, or where flightera.net does not provide the seat configuration, are then
assigned the average of the number of seats according to the aircraft model. In cases where
there is no number of seats information available for an aircraft model, we assume it to be
the average over all aircraft models.
Comparing seat configurations across the aircraft in the deplanement time series reveals
a maximum variation of 25 seats for aircraft of the same model (Boeing 757-232, equipped
with 180-205 seats). This type of aircraft has landed seven times at DCA within the time
frame considered in our time series. For smaller aircraft in the order of 50 seats, the maxi-
mum deviation in seat configuration was at most 20%.
Taxi trip records
Selected taxi trip records contain entries where geographical information are not properly
decoded, longitude or latitude information indicate locations outside the US, or zip codes
contain placeholders. Similarly, a small number of time stamps are not properly specified.
We filter these entries from the data recorded between 17/01/02-17/08/27, including 34
full weeks of records. Furthermore, our data cleansing procedure excludes data records less
than 0.25 miles or more than 1000 miles.
Data processing
In this final subsection, we detail how we integrated and analyzed the cleaned data to
obtain the results presented in the main manuscript and the first three sections of this
Supplementary Material.
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Isolation and characterization of Uber surge dynamics
For illustrations of the price time series we use the raw data recorded. To study the surge
fee time series we subtract the trip fee and pickup fee of the respective product calculated
from the recorded trip duration and distance estimates together with the trip fee parameters.
This leaves only the surge fee and surcharges. Since data on some surcharges is not available
from Uber’s API, we assume that surcharges are constant in time.[42] We estimate these
surcharges as the minimum value of the remaining surcharge plus surge fee. Subtracting
this constant value results in an estimate of the absolute surge fee time series that attains a
minimum value zero (no surge) at least once. Note that due to the rounding to integer values,
the price estimate may not reflect all changes of the trip fare, leading to small fluctuations
in the isolated surge fee that do not correspond to actual surge activity.
For better comparison between the different trips, we normalize the absolute surge fee
time series by the base cost (sum of the pickup fee, trip fee and estimated surcharges) at
that time, resulting in a relative surge factor time series for each trip and Uber product. In
general, we observe that premium Uber services have less frequent surge fee contributions
and we assume that these are typically caused by global changes such as strong demand-side
price surges or network problems influencing the price estimates. The resulting data is, for
example, shown in Fig. S6 above.
To analyze the changes in the surge factor time series, we first create a uniform represen-
tation of the surge factor time series in one minute intervals. Each point in the new time
series is calculated as the average in the five minute time window centered around t for the
respective combination of trip origin o, destination d. Each component of the price vec-
tor corresponds to an Uber service. Data points include information about approximately
three updates of the price estimate. Based on this data, we calculate the relative price
changes as the difference between consecutive time steps and discard any changes smaller
than ∆p2 < 10−7. The remaining changes form the basis for the analysis and are illustrated
in the histograms in Fig. S16.
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Computation of cross-correlations between aircraft deplanement and Uber price estimate time
series
The aircraft arrival data has a maximum resolution of one minute, with some minutes
without arrivals. Hence, we first aggregate the number of seats for each minute, and set
minutes without arrivals to zero. Then we compute the moving average with a window of
five minutes, to reduce noise and to remain consistent over the treatment of our time series.
We compute the surge fee component from the Uber price estimate according to Eq.
(S7). Because we have a much larger but irregular resolution for the Uber price estimates,
we compute the moving average of the surge fee and compute the averages for every minute.
This leaves us with the same granularity of the data as the deplanement data.
In the next step, we select a time window from the surge fee time series. We normalize
this fragment of the series by subtracting its mean and dividing by the standard deviation.
We then iterate over various lags ∆t. For each lag, we shift the deplanement data by the
corresponding amount and select the overlap with the surge fee window. We compute the
Pearson correlation coefficient ρ for these two time series according to Eq. (S8).
We repeat this procedure for different time windows (8:00 to 14:00, 14:00 to 20:00, 20:00 to
02:00, 08:00 to 20:00, 14:00 to 02:00, 08:00 to 02:00) and data from different days (19/06/04,
19/06/05 and 19/06/06), see Fig. S9.
Computation of taxi trip statistics
We organize the taxi trip data from the period of 17/01/02-17/08/27 by weekdays (Mon-
day, Tuesday, etc.). For each weekday we determine the average number of taxi trips starting
at Reagan National Airport for every minute of the day.
Because of irregularities in the timestamps of the data we are not able to obtain data for
some minutes. Therefore, we set missing values to zero, and correct them by computing a
moving average with a window of five minutes.
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